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Abstract
PETER K. ENNS: The Uniform Nature of Mass Opinion.
(Under the direction of James A. Stimson.)
This dissertation consists of three distinct chapters, which develop and test a the-
ory of Proportional Message Reception. Chapter 1 outlines the theory of Proportional
Message Reception and the resulting hypothesis of uniform opinion change. I test the
hypothesis using individual–level and sub–aggregate data on Vietnam attitudes and
defense spending preferences. Chapter 2 examines the implications of Proportional
Message reception and uniform opinion change for welfare attitudes and inequality
in the United States. Chapter 3 questions previous conceptions of opinion aggrega-
tion by showing that all segments of the public update their Policy Mood in response
to changing economic conditions. The three chapters show that it is the proportion
of countervailing messages an individual receives, not the number of messages, that
matters for opinion change. Furthermore, the analyses demonstrate—in a substantial
departure from previous literature—that the most and least politically aware segments
of the public update their opinions at the same time, in the same direction, and in
response to the same pattern of messages.
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Chapter 1
Uniform Opinion Change: Foreign
Policy and Defense
Abstract: I construct a Proportional Model of message reception, which
contends that it is the proportion of countervailing messages an individ-
ual receives, not the number of messages, that matters for opinion change.
Given this theoretical consideration, I show—in a substantial departure
from previous literature—that the most and least politically aware segments
of the public will update their opinions in tandem. I test this hypothesis
of uniform opinion change on attitudes toward the Vietnam War and de-
fense spending preferences using sub–aggregate and individual level data.
The analyses show that the most and least informed segments of the public
consistently update their attitudes at the same time, in the same direction,
and in response to the same general messages.
2In every society a stream of “free” information is continuously disseminated to all cit-
izens. (Downs, 1957, 146)
Building on the work of The American Voter , Philip Converse (1964) transformed
the study of public opinion by demonstrating that individuals’ interest in and attention
to politics profoundly influences the nature of individual political attitudes. Since
this seminal work, public opinion scholars have continued to document the effects of
political awareness on public opinion (e.g. Bartels 1994, Converse 2000, Delli Carpini &
Keeter 1996, Druckman 2005, Schneider & Jacoby 2005, Sniderman 1993, Zaller 1992).1
Macro opinion scholars argue that public opinion, in the aggregate, moves coherently
precisely because the most politically aware dominate the aggregate opinion signal.
The politically unaware, who receive virtually no political information, offer either
stable or random survey responses, and thus do not contribute to aggregate measures
of opinion change (Converse 1990, 2000, Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson 2002, Page
& Shapiro 1992, Stimson 2004; although see Althaus 2003, ch 2). Sniderman (1993,
224) explains, “Why suppose, given the striking differences in political information and
political sophistication within the mass public, that the citizen who is politically aware
and attentive makes up her mind in the same way as the political ignoramus?”
I show, however, that the focus on disparate levels of political awareness within
the electorate paints an incomplete picture of how individuals receive political mes-
sages and update their opinions. First, I outline a theory of message reception which
contends that it is the proportion of countervailing messages an individual receives,
not the number of messages, that matters for opinion change. I then demonstrate
that given this Proportional Model of message reception, the most and least politically
aware segments of the public should update their opinions in tandem. Finally, I test
1Consistent with prior literature, I use political awareness and political sophistication to refer to
individuals’ exposure to political information, motivation to obtain and comprehend information, and
intellectual ability to retain and organize this information (Luskin, 1990; Zaller, 1992).
3this hypothesis of uniform opinion change on attitudes toward Vietnam and defense
spending preferences, using sub–aggregate and individual level data. The expectation
of uniform opinion change, while distinct from most public opinion literature—which
views political awareness as central to message reception and opinion change—is consis-
tent with the few studies that have examined how different segments of the population
change opinions across extended periods of time (Ellis, Ura, & Ashley 2006, Erikson,
MacKuen, & Stimson 2002 Ch. 6, Page & Shapiro 1992 Ch.7, Stimson 2002, Soroka &
Wlezien 2006). This paper develops and tests a theoretical explanation for why these
“parallel publics” emerge.
1.1 A Proportional Model of Message Reception
Following Zaller (1991, 1992), I assume that messages about political issues reflect
opposing considerations. As Zaller (1991, 1217) notes, “with respect to every political
issue, citizens are presented with two information flows, or messages, one tending to
push mass opinion in a liberal direction and the other in a conservative direction.” I will
refer to the flow of countervailing messages about any given issue as the “Information
Stream” for that issue. In contrast to Zaller, I propose that the proportion of liberal (or
conservative) messages in the Information Stream, not the number of messages received,
is what matters for opinion change.2 The focus on the proportion of available messages
leads to a substantial revision of expectations for opinion updating. Specifically, I show
that across a variety of contexts, the most and least politically aware should update
their attitudes in unison; that is, at the same time, in the same direction, and in
2Consistent with Zaller (1992) my use of the liberal and conservative labels is only meant to convey
the “directional thrust of the message” (52, 186).
4response to the same general messages.3
To illustrate the differences between the Proportional Model and previous views of
message reception, Equation 1 presents Zaller’s Receive–Accept–Sample (RAS) model
of opinion change (Zaller, 1992, 122). The probability that an individual changes his
or her attitude is a function of the probability or receiving a change inducing message
times the probability of accepting the received message.
Pr(Change) = Pr(Reception)× Pr(Acceptance | Reception) (1.1)
Equation 1 reflects an additive view of message reception. Holding the acceptance
function constant, the more change inducing messages an individual receives (that is,
the higher the probability of message reception), the more likely the person is to update
his or her opinion (Zaller, 1992, 125). Because the most politically aware are the most
likely to receive political messages (Zaller, 1992, 42), this additive perspective leads to
the prediction that, holding acceptance constant, the most politically aware will be the
most likely to update their attitudes (Zaller, 1992, 124–126).
The additive perspective, however, ignores the fact that in a two–sided message en-
vironment, the probability that an individual receives an opposing message also varies
by political sophistication. An unaware person will have a low probability of receiv-
ing liberal and conservative messages, while a highly aware person will have a high
probability of receiving both types of messages. Thus, for issue x during time period
t, the probability of receiving a liberal message Pr(RecLib) equals the probability of
message reception Pr(Rec) times the number of liberal messages (NLib) in the Infor-
mation Stream divided by the probability of message reception times the number of
3Zaller’s RAS model predicts that the least politically aware will be highly responsive to single–
sided messages in easy learning situations. I show that the least politically aware should respond to
elite discourse for both single–sided and two–sided messages in moderate and difficult contexts.
5liberal messages plus the number of conservative messages (NCon) in the Information
Stream. That is,
Pr(RecLib) =
Pr(Rec)×NLib
Pr(Rec)× (NLib +NCon) (1.2)
This proportional model of message reception suggests that while the number of mes-
sages received by politically aware and unaware individuals will differ, the proportion
of liberal (or conservative) messages received will be equivalent.
First, consider a hypothetical situation where different media sources each depict an
issue or event with the same proportion of countervailing messages.4 Suppose that for
issue x during time period t, there are 20 liberal messages and 10 conservative messages
in the Information Stream. Also, suppose, as Zaller does (127), that a politically
unaware person has a .1 probability of receiving a message and a politically aware
person has a .9 probability of receiving a message. For a politically unaware individual,
the probability of receiving a liberal message equals .1×20
.1(20+10)
or .67. Similarly, for a
politically aware individual the probability of receiving a liberal message equals .9×20
.9(20+10)
or .67. The politically aware individual will be expected to receive nine times as many
messages as the unaware individual but both will receive the same proportion of liberal
messages. The effect of message reception largely drops out of the RAS model.5
A more general (and realistic) view of media must allow different media sources to
present different balances of opposing messages. Some media sources may present a
liberal or conservative slant. Thus, for any single issue, multiple Information Streams
4Examples of different media sources reporting an equivalent balance of opposing messages might
include the “honeymoon” period following presidential elections or the initial “rally–round–the–flag”
period following military events. The more common case of distinct media reporting is discussed
below.
5Political awareness will still matter in terms of the variance of the signal received. Politically aware
individuals, because they receive more messages, will receive a more precise estimate of the actual
Information Stream. As discussed later, political awareness also matters for message acceptance.
6may exist. Furthermore, exposure to different Information Streams may not be evenly
distributed throughout the electorate. The type of Information Stream an individual
encounters (that is, the proportion of countervailing messages) may correspond with
level of political awareness. For example, suppose that during a particular time period,
a politically unaware individual encounters an Information Stream that includes 20
positive messages and 10 negative messages about the war in Iraq. Also, suppose
that a highly aware individual encounters an Information Stream that contains 10
positive and 20 negative messages about Iraq. For the politically unaware person,
the probability of receiving a positive message remains .1×20
.1(20+10)
or .67. On the other
hand, for the politically aware person the probability of receiving a positive message
is .9×10
.9(20+10)
or .33. If we evaluate a single time point, message reception can vary by
political awareness. But we are interested in opinion change. If at time point t+1
the Iraqi insurgency increased the intensity of its attacks, both Information Streams
would reflect the increased bombings, casualties, and chaos. The unaware individual’s
Information Stream will still contain more positive messages than the aware individual’s
Information Stream, but the proportion of negative message frames reported in both
Information Streams would increase.
The expectation that different media sources will change the proportion of coun-
tervailing messages about an issue in tandem certainly holds for objective conditions.
When tax rates change, war casualties mount, or the unemployment rate shifts, it is
reasonable to expect all media sources reflect these changes. Again, even if a certain
media source typically provides a liberal or conservative slant, this pattern should be
constant. Thus, when objective conditions change, even a slanted source will reflect
these changes. A growing body of research also suggests that different media sources
change their frames in tandem for non–objective conditions. Kellstedt (2000) shows
7that the ratio of egalitarian and individualistic news stories about race changed system-
atically across time and that these patterns were roughly consistent in both Newsweek
and the New York Times. Similarly, Schneider and Jacoby (2005) show that the ratio of
positive to negative welfare messages on nightly news broadcasts and in the New York
Times changed in parallel during the 1990s. Certainly it is possible for different media
sources to diverge in how they report an issue. When this happens, we should expect
divergent patterns of message reception. The literature suggests, however, that when
reporting objective conditions, as well as many subjective issues, different sources follow
the same patterns over time. Uniform message reception is the dominant expectation.
1.1.1 Do the Uninformed Receive Any Messages?
The theoretical expectations outlined above make a minimal assumption; the least
politically aware receive some messages about political issues. But, is it reasonable
to assume that these individuals receive any messages? Converse (1990, 382) refers
to the responses of the least informed as a “sea of noise.” Delli Carpini and Keeter
(1996, 270) conclude that “large numbers of citizens are woefully underinformed.” And
Zaller (1992, 18) contends that the tendency for the poorly informed to learn about
matters that are especially important to them, “appears not to be very great or very
widespread.” Despite these conclusions, two reasons stand out for why we should expect
even the politically uninformed to receive some messages.
First, when individuals encounter messages, even if they forget or do not fully un-
derstand the details and facts, they can absorb impressions about the messages (Haidt,
2001; Kahneman, 2003; Klein, 1998). By impression, I mean a valenced consideration,
such as positive or negative, better or worse, more or less, etc. Political scientists of-
ten conceptualize political messages as pieces of information which should be stored in
memory and made available for recall (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Price and Zaller,
81993). I propose, however, that after reading the newspaper, watching the nightly news,
or listening to a conversation about a current event, the dominant consideration is not,
“I learned a fact about issue x,” but rather, “I learned good (or bad) news about x, or
government should spend more (or less) on issue x.” The reception of countervailing
impressions requires minimal attention to or understanding of the issue. Just like it
is possible (and common) to forget a new acquaintance’s name or profession and still
have a positive or negative impression about the person, an individual can disregard
the details of a political message and still receive an impression about the issue.
Second, issue frames enable even the least politically aware individuals to receive
impressions. Gleaning impressions from complex and possibly unfamiliar political is-
sues could potentially be cognitively demanding. Issue frames, however, provide the
necessary cognitive shortcut. Berinsky and Kinder (2006, 641, See also Gamson &
Modigliani 1987, 143) note that frames define, “what the essential issue is” and “how
to think about it.” Both types of issue frames (identifying the issue and suggesting
how to think about it) lead to the reception of impressions about the issue.6 Con-
sider, for example, the U.S. killing of Abu Musab al–Zarqawi, the leader of Al–Qaeda
in Iraq. Many individuals who heard about this event did not know who al–Zarqawi
was. Countless others probably forgot his name immediately after learning of his death.
Nevertheless, headlines such as, “Zarqawi’s Death, Completion of Cabinet Raise Hopes
in Iraq,” “After Long Hunt, U.S. Bombs Kill Al Qaeda Leader in Iraq,” and “Zarqawi’s
Death Could be Pivotal, Bush Says” ensured that even the least politically aware re-
ceived a positive impression about the war.7 On the other hand, stories about civilian
6The notion that individuals use media frames to receive countervailing impressions about complex
topics is consistent with research which shows that individuals can use simplifying procedures, such as
cues and heuristics, to make seemingly “informed” decisions in the absence of full information (Iyengar,
1990; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1991).
7These headlines come from the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and USA Today
(6/9/2006).
9or military casualties, car bombings, or kidnappings generally correspond with negative
frames and thus lead to negative impressions about Iraq. Whether news stories doc-
ument crime, education conditions, political corruption, or the economy, the reports
tend to correspond with the bipolar frames of good news or bad news or conditions are
getting better or worse.8
The most politically sophisticated individuals will understand (and remember) the
complexities of the messages they encounter, but all individuals, regardless of their
political awareness, will receive an impression that corresponds to the issue frame.9
Politicians, interest groups, pundits, and reporters rely on these frames to package
political information for public consumption. If a news broadcast does not signal what
the issue is, or if a politician does not clearly frame how to think about the issue, time
and money was wasted. These competitive pressures help ensure all segments of the
public receive some messages.
1.1.2 Proportional Message Reception and Opinion Change
I have argued that although the American public has remained “woefully underin-
formed” throughout the last fifty years (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996, 270), it is
reasonable to expect that even the least informed receive some impressions about po-
litical issues. Furthermore, given this expectation of some message reception, it is the
proportion of countervailing messages, not the number of messages, that matters for
message reception. Even if the proportion of messages that the most and least politi-
cally aware receive differs cross–sectionally, over time the proportions should increase
and decrease in tandem. This Proportional Model leads to an important prediction
8These examples reinforce the point that messages do not have to be strictly liberal or conservative
but, more generally, countervailing.
9See Entman (2004) for a discussion of how media frames get disseminated through the public.
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about opinion change: For a variety of issues—issues that consistently receive at least
some media attention (e.g., the environment, welfare, defense, the economy, etc.)—the
most and least politically aware should respond to elite discourse.
This is not to say that all individuals will update their attitudes in response to
received messages. We know that individuals tend to resist oppositional messages
(Taber and Lodge, 2006) and resistance is strongest among highly aware partisans
(Converse, 1962; Zaller, 1992). Additionally, not all opinion change will reflect messages
in the Information Streams. Randomly primed considerations and error in the survey
instrument can lead to random responses. Net change, however, should reflect the
changing balance of messages in the relevant Information Streams.
To test the predictions of the Proportional Message Model, I evaluate attitudes
toward the Vietnam War and defense spending preferences. I select attitudes toward
Vietnam and defense spending for three reasons. First, defense opinions provide a rigor-
ous test of the hypothesis. The least informed segment of the public is largely tuned out
and factually uninformed about issues that relate to foreign affairs and defense (Con-
verse 1964, 241, Page & Shapiro 1992, 9-11). If uniform opinion change emerges, as the
theory predicts, this pattern will not result because all segments of the public have full
or equal information about the issue. Second, current literature suggests that Vietnam
attitudes and defense spending preferences are least likely cases of observing uniform
opinion change (Bartels 1994, Zaller 1991, 1992, 1996). Finally, defense attitudes are
substantively important. Before leaving the White House, President Eisenhower cau-
tioned, “Only an alert and knowledgable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of
the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and
goals so that security and liberty may prosper together.” Understanding how different
segments of the population update their attitudes toward war and defense spending
will provide insight into the potential for citizen oversight of the military.
11
1.2 Public Opinion and the Vietnam War
The Proportional Model of message reception predicts that the most and least po-
litically aware update their opinions at the same time and in the same direction in
response to the same general messages. Changing attitudes toward the Vietnam War
offer an initial test of this hypothesis. Zaller (1991, 1992, 1996) has repeatedly shown
that due to the changing balance of two–sided messages about Vietnam, the most and
least politically aware updated their attitudes about the war distinctly. Regardless of
predisposition to support the war, he finds that the least politically aware and moder-
ately politically aware were late to receive new messages about Vietnam and thus late
to update their attitudes. Zaller writes,
The least informed within each camp [hawks and doves] behave similarly.
Owing to their habitual inattentiveness to politics, they are late to support
the war and also late to respond to antiwar information. Moderately aware
hawks and doves also behave similarly: They fail to support the war in its
initial stage because they have not been sufficiently propagandized; as the
prowar message heats up, they become more supportive of the war, but
then just as quickly begin to abandon the war when the antiwar message
becomes loud enough to reach them (204–205).
Zaller’s analysis produces a clear set of expectations regarding the effect of political
awareness on opinion change when the proportion of messages changes. The most
politically aware individuals should be the first to update their attitudes, followed by
the moderately aware, and then finally the least politically aware. Zaller examined
survey responses at two–year intervals, so these lags can be as long as two years.
Zaller’s expectations (and findings) clearly contradict the expectations of the Pro-
portional Model. Data limitations, however, forced Zaller to limit his analysis to four
12
time points at two–year intervals. Below, I evaluate the hypothesis of uniform opinion
change by examining attitudes toward Vietnam at forty–one time points. Between 1965
and 1975 Gallup asked respondents, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Presi-
dent Johnson (Nixon) is handling the situation in Vietnam?” forty–one times.10 The
ten–fold increase in the number of observations provides a much more comprehensive
view of the public’s changing attitudes about Vietnam. One disadvantage, however,
of increasing the number of observations is that to gain the time points, I must use
a different question about Vietnam attitudes than Zaller used. Thus, although both
questions relate to Vietnam, the exact question wording differs.11
1.2.1 Evidence of Uniform Opinion Change
Using the individual level data files (available through the Roper Center), it is possible
to evaluate how the most informed (those with at least some college education) and the
least informed (those with only an elementary school education) updated their attitudes
about Vietnam. Because a measure of political information (which Zaller uses) is not
available, I must use education as a proxy for political awareness. A measure of political
information would be preferable but education and political information levels relate
theoretically (Althaus 2003, 63, Converse 1974, 730, Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock
1991). Education level corresponds with individuals’ knowledge of the political process,
ability to think about political issues, and exposure to political information. For these
reasons, education is widely used to measure political information (e.g., Alvarez &
10The first four questions in the series asked “Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Johnson
Administration is dealing with the situation in Vietnam.”
11Zaller used the following question, asked by the Center for Political Studies: “Which of the
following do you think we should do now in Vietnam? Pull out of Vietnam entirely; Keep our soldiers
in Vietnam but try to end the fighting; Take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam.”
Importantly, Zaller (1992) combined the last two response categories, so his analysis treated responses
as either pro– or anti–Vietnam (198). This pro– anti–Vietnam coding makes the CPS question Zaller
used cognitively similar to the approve–disapprove question that I use.
13
Brehm 2002, 37 & 45, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, Ch.6, Stimson, 2002).12
Although I focus on education level (not political information level) and use a differ-
ent question about Vietnam than Zaller, Zaller’s Receive–Accept–Sample (RAS) model
still offers predictions about the pattern of opinion change that we should observe. The
RAS model suggests that the least educated should lag behind the changing attitudes
of the most educated. The Proportional Model, on the other hand, predicts that the
preferences of the two groups will change largely in tandem.
Figure 1.1 plots the percent who approve of how President Johnson (or Nixon)
was handling the situation in Vietnam by subgroup.13 Astonishing similarity emerges.
There is no evidence that the changing attitudes of the least informed lag behind the
attitudes of the most informed. The attitudes of those with only an elementary school
education correlate with those with a college education at r = 0.87.14
12In the subsequent section on defense spending (see note twenty–four), I show that, at least for
defense spending preferences, education level and political information level are equally valid measures
of political awareness.
13I follow the time series convention of coding percent approve as the Percent Approve/(Percent
Approve + Percent Disapprove) (Stimson, 1999, 2004). The decision to use this formula, as opposed
to simply the percent approve or disapprove, ensures that the time series variables do not incorporate
artifactual changes in the “don’t know” category, which would result from even slight changes in the
question filter (Stimson, 1999, 63). Using net preferences (e.g. Wlezien 1995, 2004) does not change
the overtime pattern or the results of the statistical analysis.
14It is possible that these strong similarities exist because I did not separate the groups by predis-
position to support the war. Although Zaller did not find differences between the patterns of opinion
change for those predisposed to support the war (hawks) and those predisposed to oppose the war
(doves) among the least and moderately politically aware, he did find distinct patterns of opinion
updating between the most aware hawks and doves. Zaller (1992) argues that the politically aware
tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political predispositions and accept arguments
consistent with their predispositions. To ensure that the similarities in Figure 1.1 do not result because
I did not disaggregate by predisposition to support the war (or in this case, the president’s handling
of the war), I reanalyzed the data, disaggregating by both education level and partisanship. Zaller
used a two–sample instrumental variable approach (Franklin, 1989) to impute whether individuals
were hawkish or dovish. Instead of imputing preferences, I use respondents’ party identification as a
measure of predisposition to support the president’s handling of the war. Party identification offers
two important advantages in the current context. Because the Vietnam question asks how the presi-
dent is handling the war, party identification relates more closely to individuals’ predisposition than a
hawk–dove measure. Second, because a direct measure of respondents’ party identification exists I do
not have to impute values, which would require the assumption that the determinants of ideological
attitudes (such as hawk–dove) remain constant across time and surveys. With the exception of the
14
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Jun-
1965
Dec-
1965
Jun-
1966
Dec-
1966
Jun-
1967
Dec-
1967
Jun-
1968
Dec-
1968
Jun-
1969
Dec-
1969
Jun-
1970
Dec-
1970
Jun-
1971
Dec-
1971
Jun-
1972
Dec-
1972
Date of Survey
P
e
r
c
e
n
t 
w
ho
 
A
pp
r
o
v
e
 
o
f h
o
w
 
P
r
e
si
de
n
t 
Jo
hn
so
n
/N
ix
o
n
 
is
 
H
a
n
dl
in
g 
V
ie
tn
a
m
College DegreeLess than High School
Less than 8th Grade
Figure 1.1: Percent who Approve of how President Johnson/Nixon is Handling Viet-
nam, by Education Level: June 1965 to January 1973
The similar series in Figure 1.1, provide initial support for the proportional view
of message reception. The next step is to directly test how different subgroups each
responded to the proportion of countervailing messages about Vietnam.
1.2.2 Measuring Messages about Vietnam
In order to analyze message reception across different segments of the population, we
need a measure of supportive and oppositional messages about Vietnam. Not every-
one receives the same messages, but the proportion of countervailing messages that
individuals receive should move in tandem. Thus, if we have a reasonable measure
Republican shift between 1968 and 1969, when Richard Nixon replaced Johnson as president, the series
display strong similarities. Between 1965 and 1968, when Zaller predicts that the attitudes of the most
informed ideologues will diverge (and thus correlate negatively), the attitudes of the most informed
Democrats and Republicans correlate at r = 0.84. These similarities between information groups, even
controlling for party identification, further validate the evidence of uniform opinion change shown in
Figure 1.1.
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of supportive and oppositional messages, this measure can serve as a proxy for over-
time variation of messages in the “Information Stream.” The World Event/Interaction
Survey (WEIS) offers an ideal source for such a measure. The WEIS data reflect all
actions and statements between countries reported in the New York Times between
1966 and 1978. The focus here is on all events reported that relate to the “Vietnam
Conflict.” Between January 1966 and June 1975, the WEIS dataset includes 6,484
unique “events” or “interactions” that relate to Vietnam. The reliance of WEIS on
the New York Times for the message data is advantageous for the present analysis.15
Although many individuals do not read the New York Times, changes in the proportion
of countervailing messages reported should roughly parallel changes in all news sources.
This expectation is consistent with research that shows that a variety of news sources
reported events that related to the Vietnam War in a consistent manner (Hallin, 1984;
Zaller and Chiu, 1996). The New York Times thus serves as a proxy for the change
in supportive and opposing information about Vietnam available to the public. For
each time point, I divide the supporting messages by the number of supporting and
opposing messages reported during the thirty days prior to the survey.16
1.2.3 Subgroup Analysis
For the following analysis, I will focus on Vietnam attitudes between February 1966
and August 1967. During this period, the President’s handling of Vietnam question
was asked on a near monthly basis (fifteen out of a possible nineteen time points).
Unfortunately, the inconsistent timing of the survey questions throughout the rest of
the series preclude using time points beyond this period. Nevertheless, Figure 1.1
15Other event count datasets code events from sources that the public would not be expected to
receive. The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), for example, includes events based on 70
international sources of newspapers, chronologies, and other historical accounts.
16See Appendix 1 for a detailed discussion of the message coding.
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suggests that the pattern of uniform opinion change was not limited to 1966 and 1967.
There is no reason to assume that opinion updating differed before or after the period of
analysis. Furthermore, the series allow us to observe how the most and least informed
updated their assessment’s of the president’s handling of the war on a monthly basis
for the middle period of Zaller’s analysis.
According to the Proportional Model, the changing proportion of supportive and
oppositional message frames about Vietnam should influence the public’s assessment
of how the president was handling the war. Some individuals will maintain consistent
attitudes and some will offer random survey responses, but systematic change should
reflect the changing balance of countervailing messages. Although different individuals
will receive different amounts of information from different sources, the proportion of
supportive to oppositional messages should change roughly in tandem for all segments
of the population.
I use a single equation Error Correction Model (ECM) to test the hypothesis that
all segments of the public update their attitudes toward Vietnam in response to the
changing proportion of countervailing messages. ECMs offer several advantages for the
current analysis. First, the dependent variable is differenced, allowing us to estimate
the determinants of change in attitudes. Differencing the dependent variable also avoids
the danger of estimating a spurious regression with near-integrated data (DeBoef and
Granato, 1997).17 ECMs also model short and long term causal effects, providing a
more complete picture of the effects of media messages on public opinion than other
time series models (Keele and DeBoef, 2004).
In the following model, short–term effects should be interpreted as the expected
change in the percent approving of the President’s handling of the war for each unit
17An augmented Dickey–Fuller test suggests the dependent variable is either an integrated or near–
integrated time series.
17
change in messages about the war. Essentially, this coefficient represents the strength
of message acceptance. Since it is possible to receive a message but not accept it, a non-
significant coefficient does not mean no messages were received (although this would
be possible). On the other hand, if the short–term effect is statistically significant,
messages must have been received. A statistically significant long–term effect suggests
that an equilibrium relationship exists between the independent and dependent vari-
able. In other words, a shift in messages about the war leads to a shift in assessments
of the president’s handling of the war in subsequent months. The Error Correction
Rate (Percent Approvet−1) indicates how quickly any long–term effects take place.18
Specifically, this coefficient indicates the percent of the long–term effect (if one exists),
which takes place in each subsequent time period.
A second modelling decision is to estimate the subgroup equations simultaneously,
as a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SUR) model (Zellner, 1962, 1963).
Given that the subgroup series come from the same surveys, we might expect con-
temporaneous correlation in the disturbance terms across equations. The SUR model
estimates this expected correlation—incorporating information that is unavailable in
separate regressions—and thus produces more efficient estimates. Binkley and Nel-
son (1988) demonstrate that efficiency gains persist even when variables are correlated
across equations, giving further evidence that the SUR model is the most efficient
estimator of the set of equations.19
Column one in Table 1.1 reports the results for those with just an Elementary
18No data are available for March 1966, July and August 1966, and February 1977. To accommodate
for the missing data, the lagged value of the dependent variable is the value at the previous available
time point.
19Estimating the equations separately does not change any results for those with an Elementary
school education or those with less than an eighth grade education. The responsiveness of the most
educated, however, does not reach statistical significance when estimated separately. The relationship
for college educated Republicans and Democrats does remain significant when estimated separately.
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school education (the least educated 29 percent of respondents). The RAS model
predicts that, “owing to their habitual inattentiveness to politics,” this group will be
“late to support the war and also late to respond to antiwar information” (Zaller 1992,
204). The Proportional Model predicts, however, that despite the limited attention
to politics, even the least informed will notice the changing balance of positive and
negative depictions of the war. Indeed, the contemporaneous relationship between
messages about Vietnam and assessments of the president’s handling of the war is
statistically significant. A standard deviation change in the percent of positive messages
about Vietnam predicts a 3.8 percent shift in the percent approving of the president’s
handling of the war. Messages about Vietnam also exert a long–term effect on Vietnam
attitudes, suggesting that as news becomes more positive or negative, the least informed
translate this information into attitudes at future time points. The error correction rate
indicates that 83 percent of the long–term effect is absorbed in the following month.
Column two examines an even smaller segment of the population, those with less
than an eighth grade education (the least educated twelve percent of respondents).
Again, consistent with the Proportional Model, we see the least informed responding
to the changing balance of messages about Vietnam. The magnitude of the coefficients
suggest that messages about Vietnam exert an even greater short–term and long–term
effect on this group’s assessments of the president’s handling of the war. The error
correction rate suggests that all of the long–term effect is absorbed in the following
month. For those with less than an 8th grade education, Vietnam messages explain
an impressive 66 percent of the variance in changing attitudes toward the president’s
handling of the war.
Column three reports the results for the those with at least some college education
(the most educated 20 percent of respondents). Both the additive and Proportional
19
Table 1.1: Determinants of Monthly Approval of The President’s Handling
of Vietnam, by Education Level: 1966–1967
Elementary Less Than Some College College
School 8th Grade College Rep. Dem.
Short–Term Effect
∆ Vietnam Messages 0.31* 0.57** 0.20† 0.29* 0.24**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (.17) (.10)
Long–Term Effect
Vietnam Messagest−1 0.44* 0.76** -0.01 0.03 0.08
(0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (.28) (.15)
Error Correction Rate
Percent Approvet−1 -0.83** -1.01** -0.71* -0.78** -0.43*
(0.18) (0.33) (0.33) (.26) (.25)
Constant 15.06 9.56 34.88† -48.28** -20.40†
(11.96) (11.16) (23.24) (17.01) (12.70)
R2 0.43 0.66 0.16 .29 .33
Percent of Respondents 28.8 12.3 19.5 7.1 6.6
Note: N = 14 for all analyses. Standard errors are in parentheses.
† = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01; one tailed tests
Models predict that the most informed will respond to relevant information, and, in-
deed, that is what we see. Although only significant at the p<.1 level, given the small
sample size and theoretical expectations, it appears that the most informed respond
to messages about Vietnam. There is no evidence, however, of a long term effect.
Columns four and five help elucidate the dynamics of opinion change of the most in-
formed. In these columns, I separate Republicans and Democrats with some College
education. Zaller suggests that highly informed individuals will counter–argue informa-
tion that contradicts their predispositions, leading to divergent opinion change among
the most informed partisans. Separating the highly informed partisans allows us to
observe whether the seemingly muted responsiveness of those with a college educa-
tion (reported in Column 3) resulted because of divergent patterns of opinion change.
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Columns 4 and 5 do not support this conclusion. We again see uniformity, not diver-
gence. For Educated Republicans and Democrats the relationship between messages
about Vietnam and the president’s handling of the war is statistically significant and of
similar magnitude. The different constant coefficients indicate that Democrats, on av-
erage, were much more supportive of Johnson’s handling of the war than Republicans,
but both groups were almost equally responsive to incoming information.
Consistent with the Proportional Model of message reception, the most and least
educated segments of the public updated their assessments of the president’s handling
of Vietnam in tandem in response to the changing balance of messages about Vietnam.
Below, I analyze the individual level dynamics of attitudes toward Vietnam.
1.2.4 Individual Level Analysis
The above analysis provides strong support for the predictions that stem from the
Proportional Model. The subgroup analysis does not, however, directly test individual
responsiveness. As Converse (2006, 608) notes, “An informed one–sixth of the electorate
can easily account for this much [aggregate] ‘signal.”’ In order to address the concern
that a small percentage of “informed” individuals in each subgroup might drive the
subaggregate results, I estimate a logit analysis of the probability that an individual
approved of the president’s handling of the war. Due to the large sample size, the
individual level analysis also offers the advantage of being able to include additional
control variables that, because of the short time series (and thus limited degrees of
freedom), could not be included in the subgroup analysis. I pool the data so the
following analysis includes each response for each monthly survey used in the above
analysis from 1966 to 1967. Because the variance is not equivalent across different
21
surveys, I report standard errors clustered around each time–point.20
We are most interested in whether individuals respond to the available balance
of supportive and oppositional messages about Vietnam. For each time point, each
individual receives the corresponding measure of messages about Vietnam. I expect
the relationship between messages about Vietnam and individual assessment of the
president’s handling of the war to be statistically significant. As with the time series
analysis, a non–significant value does not mean message reception did not occur (al-
though this is possible). But a significant relationship means message reception did
occur. To control for previous attitudes, the model includes the mean value of the
dependent variable (for each subgroup) at the previous time point. Because panel data
do not exist, this is the best available estimate of individuals’ previous attitudes. The
model also includes a variety of individual level demographic variables and whether or
not the respondent voted for Johnson in 1964.21
The first two columns in Table 1.2 report the effect of messages about Vietnam on
the probability that an individual approves of the president’s handling of the war for
respondents in the lowest two education groups. If the relationship between Vietnam
messages and Vietnam attitude is not positive and statistically significant for the least
educated individuals, the conclusions of the subgroup analysis must be tempered. A
lack of relationship at the individual level would make it impossible to reject the al-
ternative hypothesis that a few very politically informed individuals, who just happen
to have a low level of formal education, drive the subgroup results. Columns 1 and
2 show, however, that whether we analyze individuals with only an elementary school
20Including a dummy variable for each time–point (except one) or estimating a heteroskedastic
probit model are alternate ways to deal with the heteroskedastic variance. The effects reported below
do not change with either of these estimation techniques.
21Specific demographic variables include age, income, party identification, region (whether or not
the respondent was from the South), religion (separate dummy variables for Protestant and Catholic),
sex, and race (White = 1, 0 otherwise).
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education or individuals with less than an eighth grade education, respondents incorpo-
rate messages about Vietnam into their assessments of the president’s handling of the
war. Holding the other variables at their mean, a standard deviation increase (around
the mean) in the percent of positive messages about Vietnam predicts a .04 increase
in the probability of approving of the presidents handling of the war. A change from
the minimum to maximum percent of positive messages predicts a .17 increase in the
probability of approving of the president’s handling of the war. For individuals with
less than an eighth grade education, these predicted probabilities double to .08 and .33,
respectively.
Column 3 reports the individual level results for those with at least some college
education. Two differences stand out from the analysis of the least informed individu-
als. First, prior attitudes influence current attitudes at a statistically significant level.
Consistent with prior literature (Converse, 1964), this result suggests that attitudes
of the most informed are the most stable. Second, messages about Vietnam are not
statistically significant. The lack of significant relationship suggests that in the previ-
ous subgroup analysis, it was just a portion of the most educated contributing to the
sub–aggregate results. Columns 4 and 5 include only Republicans and Democrats with
some college education. These results largely parallel column three.
The subgroup and individual level analyses suggest that—far from lagging behind
the more informed respondents—the least informed, as a group and individually, were
the most responsive to elite discourse about Vietnam. Although the least informed
receive less information than the most informed, for Vietnam, at least, the changing
proportion of messages influences their month–to–month opinion change.
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Table 1.2: Pooled Logit Analysis of The President’s Handling of Vietnam,
by Education Level: 1966–1967
Elementary Less Than Some College College
School 8th Grade College Rep. Dem.
Approvalt−1 0.98 -0.22 2.13** 1.77* 1.23
(0.57) (0.72) (0.79) (0.87) (1.29)
Vietnam Messages 0.013* 0.025** 0.001 .001 .006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (.011) (.006)
Constant -2.82** -3.32** -3.27** -2.39** -1.87
(0.31) (0.50) (0.31) (0.83) (1.08)
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.19 0.08 .04 .04
Pct. Correctly Classified 64.9 65.4 61.2 63.1 63.0
N 10,327 4,312 8,605 3,153 2,878
Note: Controls for demographic characteristics and 1964 Presidential vote not shown.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *= p < 0.05, **= p < 0.01; two tailed tests
Pseudo R2 is McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2
1.3 Defense Spending Preferences
The above analyses of attitudes toward Vietnam—at least assessments of how the pres-
ident was handling Vietnam—strongly support the expectations of the Proportional
Model of message reception. Vietnam has traditionally been characterized as a most
likely case for observing differential opinion change due to the least politically aware’s
limited message reception (Zaller, 1992). Nevertheless, it is necessary to test the Pro-
portional Model over a longer period of time. Baum (2002) shows that soft news
brings information about high profile foreign policy crises to the inattentive public in
an entertainment–like fashion. Although the Vietnam era precedes the “soft news” en-
vironment that Baum describes, analyzing defense spending from 1973 to 1989 ensures
that the test of the Proportional Model is not an assessment of the effects of soft news
reporting on a single high profile crisis. Defense policy is regarded as a cognitively diffi-
cult issue, largely out of reach of much of the public (McClosky, Hoffman and O’Hara,
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1960; Hill and Hurley, 1999).22 If uniform opinion change emerges, as the Proportional
Model predicts, it will not be because all individuals have full or equal information.
The first task is to develop an annual measure of defense spending preferences for
each political awareness level. Three surveys (General Social Survey (GSS), Roper, and
Gallup) have asked defense spending questions almost every year between 1972 and 1979
(the last year of the U.S.–Soviet data). During this time period, GSS and Roper asked
the same question about defense spending preferences thirty times. The GSS defense
question was asked near the start of each year (February, March, or April) and the Roper
defense question was asked each December. Gallup asked an almost identical question
about defense spending preferences sixteen times (in various months) between 1973 and
1989.23 For each survey question, I take the percent of survey participants responding
“spending too much” on defense divided by the percent responding “spending too
much” plus the percent responding “spending too little.” Thus, higher values indicate
that the public believes the government is spending too much on defense. I employ
Stimson’s (1999) Dyad Ratios algorithm, which uses a factor analytic approach to
combine responses to these 46 questions into a single index of the public’s annual
preferences for defense spending.24 Although the three series of questions (GSS, Gallup,
22Information about foreign affairs is, of course, not completely out of reach of the public. Aldrich,
Sullivan and Borgida (1989) show that during presidential campaigns voters are able to respond to
candidates’ foreign policy appeals.
23GSS and ROPER asked: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be
solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like
you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the
right amount... Are we spending too much, too little, or the right amount on the military, armaments,
and defense? GALLUP asked: There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government
in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this:
Do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount?
24I use Stimson’s algorithm with the exponential smoothing function turned off. The algorithm
is designed to extract the underlying dimension of common survey question items. Random survey
responses detract from the “true” nature of series over time, so generally the smoothing function is
used to attenuate random error. A potential difference between the responses of the most and least
politically aware, however, is that the least aware may offer more random responses. Smoothing
across responses, while creating a more accurate picture of the overall electorate, could potentially
25
and Roper) correlate highly, combining the questions into a single index offers the
advantage of a more comprehensive annual measure of spending preferences.25 I repeat
the process, grouping respondents by education level, to create an annual time series of
defense spending preferences for each information group. Figure 1.2 plots these series
by education level.26
As with attitudes toward the president’s handling of the Vietnam War, the series
move in tandem. From 1972 to 1989, the percent in each group responding that the
government was spending “too much” on defense decreased each year. In 1980, how-
ever, the public mood shifts, and the percent responding spending “too much” begins
create false similarities between political awareness levels. The smoothing function was thus turned
off for all analyses to ensure that any similarities between subgroups exist in the raw data.
25The three series each correlate with the resulting overall index at r = 0.95 or above.
26The American National Election Surveys (ANES) offer a unique opportunity to test the assumption
that using education level instead of political information level as a measure of political awareness does
not change the results of the analysis. The ANES asks respondents their education level and questions
that reflect their political information level. Although the bi–annual nature of the ANES does not
permit time–series regression analysis, respondents can be grouped by both education level and political
information level. If the defense spending preferences of the least (and most) educated and the least
(and most) politically informed correlate highly, we can be confident that there is significant overlap
between these two subgroups. In other words, using a measure of political information (if it was
available) would not lead to different results than using the education measure. On the other hand, if
significant differences appear, we will have evidence that the opinions of education groups and political
information groups move distinctly, indicating that education level may not a valid proxy for political
awareness level. The ANES has asked a question about defense spending eleven times. For each of
these years, I group respondents with less than a high school education and those with a college degree
or higher. Following Zaller (1992), I then create a thirteen point index of political information. The
political information index is based on the following criteria: correctly identifying which political party
controls the House, which party controls the Senate, and correct (relative) placement of the parties on
defense spending, government service, aid to Blacks, liberal/conservative scale, guaranteed jobs, and
health care. Each correct response is coded as a one. Respondents could also get five points based
on the interviewer rating of respondent’s level of political information. Based on these classifications,
I examine the relationship between the defense spending preferences of the education and political
information groups. The defense spending preferences of the least educated (the lowest 19 percent of
respondents) correlate with the preferences of the least politically informed (the lowest 17 percent of
respondents) at r = 0.96. The defense preferences of the most educated (the highest 21 percent of
respondents) and the most politically informed (the highest 23 percent of respondents) correlate at
r = 0.98. The overwhelmingly similar patterns of opinion change between political information and
education levels suggest that education level is indeed a valid measure of political awareness.
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Figure 1.2: Defense Spending Attitudes by Education Level, 1972–1989
to increase again. The three series correlate at r = 0.89 or above. In contrast to pre-
vious research, we see no evidence that “Both the level and the structure of defense
spending preferences among the least informed 60 percent of the public have changed
only marginally since the early 1980s” (Bartels 1994, 497). The next task is to opera-
tionalize the information streams that relate to defense spending preferences in order
to analyze the determinants of opinion change.
1.3.1 Information Streams that Relate to Defense
I rely on two potential streams of information which relate to defense spending pref-
erences during the 1970s and 1980s: messages about U.S.–Soviet relations and annual
defense budget appropriations. These information streams offer two advantages for test-
ing the Proportional Model. First, prior research shows that changes in U.S.–Soviet
relations and budget appropriations influence the public’s defense spending preferences
(Hartley and Russett, 1992; Wlezien, 1996; Witko, 2003). Thus, at least some segments
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of the public associate these messages with defense spending. Second, these two in-
formation sources are ideal because large portions of the public cannot recall specific
details about military spending and U.S.–Soviet relations (Delli Carpini and Keeter,
1996, Ch.2). The low levels of factual information suggest that if the least informed
respond to changes in defense appropriations and messages about U.S.–Soviet relations,
they are not responding to specific details, but to changes in the proportion of opposing
frames, as the Proportional Model of message reception predicts.
Given the theoretical desirability of these two information streams, the next task is
to develop valid measures of the messages that constitute each stream of information.
For a measure of news about U.S.–Soviet relations, I again rely on the WEIS data.
Goldstein and Freeman (1990) have extended the WEIS data to create a monthly time
series of U.S. actions toward the Soviet Union from 1966 to 1989.27 Higher values reflect
message frames that would lead to a positive impression about U.S.–Soviet relations,
such as summits and treaties. Lower values reflect message frames that would lead to
negative impressions, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. boycott of
the 1980 Olympics, or the Soviet shooting down of KAL flight 007.28 Witko (2003)
combines the monthly series into a quarterly measure and shows that the public, as a
whole, responds to these messages. I combine the data to form an annual series.
The second information stream consists of defense appropriations. Instead of mea-
suring news messages about the budget, I use actual budget appropriations. The deci-
sion to use actual budget data, as opposed to news messages about the budget, stems
from prior research. Wlezien (1996; see also Witko 2003) shows that the public re-
sponds almost immediately to defense appropriations. As appropriations increase (or
27Because Goldstein and Freeman report the net number of positive messages for each month, it is
not possible to calculate the proportion. I thus use the net number of positive messages.
28See Goldstein and Freeman (1990, 48-50) for a detailed overview of the events which the series
reflect.
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decrease), the public’s spending preferences respond thermostatically and decrease (or
increase) (Wlezien, 1995, 1996; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002). This thermo-
static pattern suggests that changes from the budgetary status quo lead to negative
impressions about government spending. It may be that most of the public simply has
a bias toward the status quo (whatever that amount happens to be), so that anytime
news stories report a budgetary increase or decrease this leads to negative impressions
and preferences move in the opposite direction.29 Or, budgetary changes may galvanize
support for opposing sides who increase the proportion of countervailing messages (in-
crease or decrease spending) in the information stream. In either case, the public, as a
whole, translates changes in budget appropriations into spending preferences. Thus, I
predict all segments of the population will adjust their defense spending preferences in
response to actual changes in defense appropriations.30
1.3.2 Subgroup Analysis
Prior research shows that the percent of the public favoring more or less defense spend-
ing responds to changes in budget appropriations and U.S.–Soviet relations (Jentleson
and Britton, 1998; Witko, 2003; Wlezien, 1995, 1996). I expect to find the same pattern
of opinion updating for each education level. As with the Vietnam analysis, I use a
single equation Error Correction Model to estimate changes in defense spending pref-
erences. Subgroups are again estimated jointly with a Seemingly Unrelated Regression
29Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) show that individual decision making across a wide variety of
contexts reflects a strong status quo bias.
30Due to the fiscal calendar, appropriations decisions are generally made during the last quarter
of the previous year. Thus, a contemporaneous relationship indicates that budget decisions made at
the end of the previous year influence the public’s defense attitudes during the current year. The
measure of defense appropriations comes from the Annual Senate Document, Appropriations, Budget
Estimates, Etc.
29
Equation model.31
Column one of Table 1.3 reports the effect of U.S.–Soviet relations and defense ap-
propriations on the defense spending preferences of all respondents. Consistent with
prior research, the effects of messages about U.S.–Soviet relations and budget appro-
priations are statistically significant and substantively important. During the 1970s
and 1980s, as news about U.S.–Soviet relations becomes more positive (negative), the
percent of respondents favoring less (more) defense spending increased. The average
annual change in U.S.–Soviet relations, predicts a 5.9 percent shift in the percent of
respondents who prefer more or less defense spending. Similarly, an increase (decrease)
in defense appropriations corresponds with an expected increase (decrease) in the per-
cent of the public responding that the government is spending too much on defense.
The average annual change in defense appropriations predicts an 8 percent shift in the
percent of respondents favoring more or less defense spending. These results, which
parallel findings in previous research, further validate the use of the ECM.
The second column shows the results for the most informed 18 percent of respon-
dents. The relationships between the independent variables and defense spending pref-
erences are statistically significant and almost identical in size to the coefficients for
all respondents. Consistent with Bartles’ (1994) analysis, the most politically informed
translated changes in U.S–Soviet relations into their defense spending preferences. Both
the Proportional Model and additive views of message reception expect these similar-
ities between the most informed and all respondents. The third column reports the
determinants of defense spending preferences for those who only attained an elemen-
tary school education or less—the least informed 11 percent of respondents. Additive
31Estimating the equations separately produces the same results, with two exceptions. The long–
term effect of U.S–Soviet Relations for those with a College education and the contemporaneous effect
of changes in budget appropriations for those with an Elementary school education just miss statistical
significance (p=.11).
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Table 1.3: Annual Determinants of the Percent Responding “Spending Too
Much” on Defense, by Information Level, 1973–1989
At Least Elementary
All College Deg. School
Short–Term Effects
∆ U.S.–Soviet Relations 0.25** 0.28** 0.21**
(0.06) (0.11) (0.08)
∆ Budget Appropriations 0.49** 0.41* 0.23*
(0.10) (0.19) (0.14)
Long–Term Effects
U.S.–Soviet Relationst−1 0.18* 0.31* -0.02
(0.10) (0.17) (0.16)
Budget Appropriationst−1 0.10* 0.19** 0.09
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
Error Correction Rate
Defense Preferencest−1 -0.20 -0.60** -0.35†
(0.16) (0.23) (0.17)
Constant -20.65* -17.09 -15.73
(7.98) (15.13) (12.31)
R2 0.86 0.58 0.75
Percent of Respondents 100 18.2 11.0
Note: N=16 for all analyses. Standard errors in parentheses.
*=p <0.05, **=p<0.01; one tailed tests
views of message reception predict that this segment of the population, due to general
inattentiveness to politics, will be late to respond or unresponsive to relevant informa-
tion. Yet, the relationships between U.S.–Soviet relations and budget appropriations
are statistically significant. Furthermore, although the coefficients are smaller for the
least informed, cross–equation tests for equality show that the coefficients of the two
education groups are not statistically different from each other. Far from finding that
“only the more informed stratum of the general public has so far succeeded in grasp-
ing...the implications for U.S. defense policy of the declining Soviet threat” (Bartels,
1994, 498), the least politically informed responded to changing information about
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U.S.–Soviet relations and budget appropriations.32
1.3.3 Individual Level Analysis
The subgroup analysis of defense spending preferences provides further support for the
Proportional Model. Yet, as with attitudes toward Vietnam, it is important to evaluate
opinion change at the individual level. I pool the individual level data from 1973 to 1989
and estimate an ordered logit model of the probability that an individual responded
spending too little, spending the right amount, or spending too much on defense.33
The key variables of interest are U.S.–Soviet Relations and Budget Appropriations. For
each time point, each respondent receives the annual value of U.S.–Soviet Relations and
defense Budget Appropriations. The analysis also controls for previous defense spending
preferences (the mean value of the lagged dependent variable for each subgroup), party
identification, political ideology, and various demographic characteristics.34
Table 1.4 reports, for each education group, the effect of relevant Information
Streams on individual level defense spending preferences. Remarkable similarity ex-
ists across the individuals in the three education groups. Although the coefficient is
slightly larger for the most educated, the effect of prior defense spending attitudes is
statistically significant for individuals in all education groups. Similarly, the effect of
U.S.–Soviet Relations and Budget Appropriations is significant for individuals in each
32An important difference between the present analysis and Bartels’ analysis is that Bartels com-
pared the determinants of defense spending preferences in 1982–1984 and 1992. Because the U.S.–
Soviet Relations data only extend to 1989, the above analysis cannot include an observation from
1992, Bartels’ reference point for opinion change.
33This question comes from the GSS. Because the control variables must come from the same survey
as the dependent variable, only one of the three surveys used to comprise the dependent variable in
the subgroup analysis could be used. I selected the GSS question because it was asked the most times.
34Demographic controls include region (whether the respondent is from the South), race (White
= 1, 0 otherwise), sex, and income. As with the individual level Vietnam analysis, I control for
heteroskedastic error variance by estimating clustered standard errors, clustered by time–point. Again,
using annual dummy variables to control for heteroskedastic variance does not change the results.
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Table 1.4: Pooled Ordered Logit Analysis of Defense Spending Preferences,
by Education Level: 1973–1989
Less Than Less Than At Least
8th Grade H.S. Deg. College
Spending Preferencest−1 0.66** 0.60** 0.78**
(0.22) (0.14) (0.20)
U.S.–Soviet Relations 0.011** 0.011* 0.013*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Budget Appropriations 0.005** 0.006** 0.008**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
PID 0.004 -0.019 -0.133**
(0.030) (0.014) (0.033)
cut1 0.33 0.47 -1.11
(0.52) (0.46) (0.78)
cut2 2.61 2.61 0.86
(0.60) (0.47) (0.73)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.24
N 745 3,568 2,176
Note: Controls for demographic characteristics not shown.
*= p<0.05, **= p<0.01, two tailed tests; Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. Pseudo R2 is McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2
education group. For individuals with less than an 8th grade education, a standard
deviation increase (around the mean) in positive stories about U.S.–Soviet Relations
predicts a .07 decrease in the probability of responding spending too little on defense
and a .05 increase in the probability of responding spending too much. For those with
a college degree, the same shift in stories about U.S.–Soviet Relations leads to a .05 de-
crease in the probability of responding spending too little on defense and a .09 increase
in the probability of responding spending too much. Changes in Budget Appropriations
lead to similar substantive conclusions for the most and least informed. For individuals
with less than an 8th grade education, a standard deviation increase (around the mean)
in defense appropriations predicts a .06 decrease in the probability of responding spend-
ing too little on defense and a .04 increase in the probability of responding spending
too much. For those with a college degree, the same shift in defense appropriations
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leads to a .05 decrease in the probability of responding spending too little on defense
and a .11 increase in the probability of responding spending too much. It appears that
the highly educated are more willing to respond “spending too much” but individuals
in both groups show the same patterns of responsiveness.
Interestingly, the effect of party identification is only significant for the most in-
formed. Republicans with some college education are less likely to respond that the
government is spending too much on defense than Democrats. Thus, it would be wrong
to conclude that political information does not matter. At the individual level, only the
more educated show consistency between their party identification and defense spend-
ing preferences. Unlike prior research, however, individuals in all information groups
appear to respond to relevant messages in a uniform manner. It is difficult to say
whether this responsiveness would satisfy President Eisenhower’s call for “an alert and
knowledgable citizenry,” but the above analysis suggests that the least informed are
much more alert and responsive to information that relates to defense spending than
previously thought.
1.4 Conclusions and Implications
In a substantial departure from previous literature, I have shown that the most and
least politically aware respond to political messages in a uniform manner. That is,
they update their attitudes at the same time, in the same direction, and in response to
the same general messages. These results exist for both subgroup and individual level
analyses of Vietnam and defense spending preferences. Of course, future research must
test the Proportional Model on additional issue areas. Yet, at a minimum, the above
analysis modifies our understanding of public opinion about defense and foreign policy
issues. For these issues, opinion change does not depend on the quantity of messages
an individual receives or an individual’s ability to recall the details of the message.
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Rather, individuals update their opinions in response to changes in the proportion of
countervailing messages in the relevant Information Streams.
The empirical support for the Proportional Model, while distinct from previous
models of opinion change, sheds light on several findings in public opinion research. For
example, Druckman and Jacobs (2006) show that President Nixon and his staff invested
large sums of “White House time and money” in opinion polling (458). Furthermore,
they show that Nixon incorporated policy specific details from these polls into his
speeches. Previous models of public opinion suggest that this was wasteful behavior.
According to additive views of opinion change, Nixon and all subsequent presidents who
have invested in opinion polling should have only polled and responded to the most
politically informed; the individuals who receive and respond to political information.
In contrast, the Proportional Model suggests that politicians who invest in and respond
to opinion polls are indeed behaving rationally. All segments of society receive and
respond to political messages.
The Proportional Model also provides a causal explanation for the findings that the
most and least educated subgroups update their opinions in “parallel” (Erikson, MacK-
uen and Stimson, 2002; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Stimson, 2002; Soroka and Wlezien,
2006). The standard view that aggregate public opinion “is very recognizable because
it is undoubtedly shaped in large measure by the small minority of the electorate
that is nearly as well informed about these matters as our elite informants” cannot
adequately explain the parallelism result (Converse, 1990, 382). By contrast, the Pro-
portional Model of message reception provides a theoretical basis for understanding
parallel opinion change.
The lingering question is why have previous analyses found that with cognitively
difficult issues, such as Vietnam and defense spending preferences, the attitudes of
the least informed either do not change or they lag behind the changing attitudes of
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the most informed? The different research design employed here, including different
model specification and different question wording, does not permit a definitive answer
to this question. However, two differences between this and previous research stand
out as important candidates for why distinct results emerged. First, unlike previous
research, the above analyses include an actual measure of relevant information. It is
not surprising that different results emerge when a measure of information is included
in the model of opinion change. Second, prior research that has found different patterns
of opinion change between different levels of political information has analyzed fewer
time points at much longer intervals. Again, it is not surprising that opinion dynamics
look different depending on the number and interval of time–points that are observed.
When data permit, future research should analyze other policy issues over extended
time periods and should include measures of relevant Information Streams. I expect
evidence of uniform causal dynamics across information levels will result.
Finally, the similar patterns of opinion change should not overshadow the cross–
sectional opinion differences between information levels which persist over time. The
more educated segment of society consistently prefers less defense spending than the
least educated. These results support Althaus’ (2003) finding that the attitudes of
the least informed systematically influence aggregate measures of public opinion. The
cross–sectional differences also corroborate research that shows that policy specific ig-
norance leads many Americans to hold political views different from those they would
otherwise hold (Gilens, 2001). In other words, individuals’ initial opinions about a spe-
cific issue may depend on their political information level. However, once an opinion
is formed, the process of updating appears to be consistent across information levels.
Future research should explore the differences between opinion formation and opinion
updating. It may be that when a new issue, such as an international conflict, emerges,
some individuals rely on social cues to form their preferences, while other individuals
36
rely on issue specific information. Differences in political awareness may explain dif-
ferences in initial preference formation. Once initial impressions are formed, however,
all segments of the population—even the least informed ten percent of respondents—
update their opinions in response to the same pattern of messages.
Chapter 2
Welfare Attitudes and Inequality in
the United States
Abstract: Explanations of inequality in the United States often point to
the disproportionate political voice exercised by social elites. A second body
of research, however, shows that for a variety of policy issues, high and low
income groups update their attitudes in parallel. Thus, regardless of which
group government actually hears, when policy follows public opinion, all
groups receive equal representation. This article seeks to reconcile these
seemingly conflicting findings by showing that “parallel” opinion change
and representation do not necessarily lead to more redistributive policies.
I analyze welfare attitudes from 1973 to 2004 and show that all segments
of society update their welfare attitudes in response to the same general
messages. As a consequence, when elite discourse turns against welfare—as
it did during the 1990s—even those most likely to benefit from redistrib-
utive policies reduce their support for welfare spending. It follows that
equal representation, while a necessary condition of democracy, does not
automatically improve the conditions of the most disadvantaged.
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Explanations of the persistent inequality in the United States often point to the
disproportionate political voice exercised by social elites.1 Theories of unequal voice
contend that different socio–economic groups prefer different policies and, due to their
dominant political voice, social elites generally receive their preferred policy outcomes
(Bartels, 2005; Gilens, 2005; Schlozman et al., 2005). A second body of research,
however, shows that for a variety of policy issues, high and low income groups update
their attitudes in parallel (Page and Shapiro, 1992). Thus, regardless of which group
government actually hears, when policy follows public opinion, the changing preferences
of all groups receive equal representation (Soroka and Wlezien, 2006; Ura and Ellis,
2007).
Evidence of parallel opinion change (and thus parallel representation) across in-
come groups is surprising for a variety of reasons. First, in the United States, income
level correlates highly with education and political information level (Delli Carpini and
Keeter, 1996, Ch.7). Because the least politically informed (those without a political
voice) do not receive and respond to messages the same way as the most politically in-
formed (Bartels, 1994; Converse, 2000; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Druckman, 2005;
Schneider and Jacoby, 2005; Sniderman, 1993; Zaller, 1992), we should observe different
patterns of opinion change between socio–economic groups. Second, even if the polit-
ically uninformed did receive relevant economic and political messages, because this
group is largely comprised of socially disadvantaged individuals, their interests should
be different from the most politically aware. Why would those in the lowest income or
education group ever prefer less government spending on education or welfare? Yet, the
preferences of the most socially disadvantaged do change, and they change in tandem
with social elites. During the last thirty years, the education spending preferences of
1See, for example, the American Political Science Association Task Force on Inequality and Amer-
ican Democracy’s report, American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality.
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the most and least educated segments of the population correlate at r = 0.74. Similarly,
welfare spending preferences of the highest and lowest income groups correlate at r =
0.80. Even the changing tax preferences of the wealthiest and least aﬄuent correlate
at r = 0.74.2
Findings of parallel opinion change suggest that in order to fully understand in-
equality in the United States, we not only need to understand when different segments
of the population receive different levels of representation, but why different groups pre-
fer the policies they do. Specifically, we need to understand why the highest and lowest
socio–economic groups change their attitudes in tandem. I focus on change because
opinion change is the stimulus to which re–election minded politicians should respond
(Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, 1995). If opinions have not changed, politicians face
no incentive to adjust the policy status quo.
This paper proceeds in two stages. First, I develop a Proportional Model of message
reception, which predicts that different segments of the population will update their
attitudes at the same time, in the same direction, and in response to the same general
messages. While existing research has shown evidence of parallel opinion change (Page
and Shapiro, 1992; Soroka and Wlezien, 2006; Ura and Ellis, 2007), this paper goes
beyond the empirical findings to explain why these patterns of opinion change emerge.
Furthermore, the model predicts when certain segments of the population will follow
elite discourse against their own self interest. I then test the predictions which stem
from the model on welfare attitudes from 1973 to 2004. The analysis shows that when
elite discourse turns against welfare, as it did during the early 1990s, even the least
2Data come from the General Social Survey Cumulative File, 1972 to 2004. High and low education
groups correspond to those with at least a college degree and those with less than a high school degree.
High and low income groups correspond to the highest 30 percent and lowest 20 percent household
incomes. Spending preferences reflect net spending support, which equals the percent responding
“spending too little” minus the percent responding “spending too much.” Tax preferences reflect the
percent responding their federal taxes are too high minus the percent responding that they are too
low. See Soroka and Wlezien (2007) for additional analysis of these policy issues.
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educated and lowest income groups conform. Depending on elite discourse, parallel
opinion change—and thus parallel representation—can reduce redistributive policies.
2.1 A Proportional Model of Message Reception
Converse (1990, 372) writes, “The two simplest truths I know about the distribution
of political information in modern electorates is that the mean is low and the variance
high.” The knowledge that the electorate is bound on one side by politically informed
individuals who regularly attend to political messages and on the other side by inatten-
tive individuals who cannot recall even the most basic political facts has made political
information central to the study of public opinion (Druckman, 2005; Ferejohn and Kuk-
linski, 1990; Saris and Sniderman, 2004; Sniderman, 1993; Zaller, 1992). The standard
view has become the more change inducing messages an individual receives, the more
likely the person is to update his or her opinion. Some individuals are more or less
likely to accept the messages they receive (Converse, 1962; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Za-
ller, 1992), but holding message acceptance constant, scholars have converged around
an additive view of message reception. The more messages received, the greater the
probability of opinion change (Bartels, 1994; Converse, 2000; Delli Carpini and Keeter,
1996; Druckman, 2005; Price and Zaller, 1993; Schneider and Jacoby, 2005; Sniderman,
1993; Zaller, 1992).
The theory of unequal political voice, although not explicitly rooted in public opin-
ion literature, coincides with the additive view of message reception. The additive view
suggests that the socially disadvantaged, due to their low levels of political awareness,
are unlikely to receive—and thus respond to—available political and economic infor-
mation. The theory of unequal political voice predicts that the socially disadvantaged
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formulate policy preferences based on personal conditions. Regardless of changing eco-
nomic or political news, the least educated and lowest income citizens should consis-
tently express support for certain policies such as better schools, more health care, and
increased government spending on welfare. Inequality would decrease, the argument
goes, if government “heard” this segment of the population.
I argue, however, that both perspectives understate the influence of elite discourse on
the attitudes of the most socially disadvantaged segment of society. Instead of focusing
on the number of messages an individual receives, I propose that the proportion of
countervailing messages is what matters for opinion change. Zaller (1991, 1992) shows
that messages about political issues reflect opposing considerations. He writes (1991,
1217), “with respect to every political issue, citizens are presented with two information
flows, or messages, one tending to push mass opinion in a liberal direction and the
other in a conservative direction.” The additive perspective ignores the fact that in
a two–sided message environment, the probability of receiving both types of messages
varies by political information. An uninformed person will have a low probability of
receiving liberal and conservative messages, while a highly informed person will have a
high probability of receiving both types of messages.3 Furthermore, as I show below,
across a variety of contexts, the proportion of available messages will change in tandem
for different segments of the population. As a result of these uniform patterns of
message reception, all subgroups should update their policy attitudes in response to
elite discourse.4
First, consider a hypothetical situation where different media sources each depict
3Consistent with Zaller (1992) my use of the liberal and conservative labels is only meant to convey
the “directional thrust of the message” (52, 186).
4Zaller’s (1992) RAS model predicts that the least politically aware will be highly responsive to
single–sided messages in easy learning situations. I propose that the least politically aware will also
be responsive to elite discourse for both single–sided and two–sided messages in moderate and difficult
contexts.
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an issue or event with the same proportion of countervailing messages.5 Thus, a single
“Information Stream,” defined as the proportion of available countervailing messages,
exists. Suppose that for issue x during time period t, there are 20 positive messages
and 10 negative messages in the Information Stream. Also, suppose that a politically
unaware person has a .1 probability of receiving a message and a politically aware
person has a .9 probability of receiving a message. We expect the politically unaware
person to receive two positive messages (.1 × 20) and the politically aware person to
receive eighteen positive messages (.9 × 20). According to the additive perspective
(holding message acceptance constant), the politically aware person is nine times more
likely to take a favorable view of issue x. However, for a politically unaware individual
the probability of receiving a positive message equals .1×20
.1(20+10)
or .67. Similarly, for
a politically aware individual the probability of receiving a positive message equals
.9×20
.9(20+10)
or .67. The politically aware individual will be expected to receive nine times
as many messages as the unaware individual, but both will receive the same proportion
of positive messages. The effect of political awareness largely drops out of the additive
view of message reception.6
A more general (and realistic) view of media must allow different media sources to
present different balances of opposing messages. Some media sources may present a
liberal or conservative slant. Thus, for any single issue, multiple Information Streams
may exist. Furthermore, exposure to different Information Streams may not be evenly
distributed throughout the electorate. The type of Information Stream an individual
encounters (that is, the proportion of countervailing messages) may correspond with
5Examples of different media sources reporting the same balance of opposing messages might include
the “honeymoon” period following presidential elections or the initial “rally–round–the–flag” period
following military events. I discuss the more common case of distinct media reporting below.
6Political awareness will still matter in terms of the variance of the signal received. Politically aware
individuals, because they receive more messages, will receive a more precise estimate of the actual
Information Stream. As discussed later, political awareness also matters for message acceptance.
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education or income level. For example, suppose that during a particular time period,
a low income individual encounters an Information Stream that includes 20 positive
messages and 10 negative messages about welfare. Also, suppose that a high income
individual encounters an Information Stream that contains 10 positive and 20 negative
messages about welfare. For the low income person, the probability of receiving a
positive message remains .1×20
.1(20+10)
or .67. On the other hand, for the high income
person the probability of receiving a positive message is .9×10
.9(20+10)
or .33. If we evaluate
a single time point, message reception can vary by income level. But we are interested
in opinion change. If at time point t+1, political discourse about welfare becomes
more negative (as it did during the early 1990s), all media should reflect this change.
Some news sources will continue to report more positive stories than others, but the
proportion of positive to negative stories should decrease across all media sources.
The expectation that different media sources will change the proportion of coun-
tervailing messages about an issue in tandem certainly holds for objective conditions.
When tax rates change, war casualties mount, or the unemployment rate shifts, it is
reasonable to expect all media sources reflect these changes. Even if a certain media
source typically provides a liberal or conservative slant, this pattern should be con-
stant. Thus, when objective conditions change, even a slanted source will reflect these
changes. A growing body of research also suggests that different media sources change
their frames in tandem for non–objective conditions. Kellstedt (2000) shows that the
ratio of egalitarian and individualistic news stories about race changed systematically
across time and that these patterns were roughly consistent in both Newsweek and the
New York Times. Similarly, Schneider and Jacoby (2005) show that the ratio of positive
to negative welfare messages on nightly news broadcasts and in the New York Times
changed in parallel during the 1990s. Certainly it is possible for different media sources
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to diverge in how they report an issue. When this happens, we should expect diver-
gent pattern of message reception. The literature suggests, however, that reporting of
objective conditions, as well as many subjective issues, different media sources follow
the same patterns over time. Uniform message reception is the dominant expectation.
2.1.1 Subgroup Predictions
The Proportional Model of message reception predicts that for any issue that receives
at least some consistent media attention (e.g., the environment, defense, the economy,
etc.), the proportion of messages that different segments of society receive will change
in tandem. Uniform message reception does not, however, mean that all individuals
will update their attitudes in response to received messages. We know that individuals
tend to resist oppositional messages (Taber and Lodge, 2006) and resistance is strongest
among highly aware partisans (Converse, 1962; Zaller, 1992). Thus, some people will
be more slow to update their attitudes in response to received messages than others.
Additionally, not all opinion change will reflect messages in the Information Streams.
Randomly primed considerations and error in the survey instrument will lead to random
responses. Net change, however, should reflect the changing balance of messages in the
relevant Information Streams. As a result, the percent in each subgroup supporting a
given policy should change at the same time and in the same direction in response to
changes in the relevant Information Streams.
The expectation of uniform opinion change contrasts with previous research, which
does not expect the least informed to systematically receive and respond to media
messages about difficult issues (Converse 1990, 282, Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson
2002, 5, Zaller 1992). A second implication of the Proportional Model is that when
elite discourse moves away from the interests of the socially disadvantaged, this group’s
aggregate opinion signal will move against the group’s interests. This expectation
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stems from research which shows the least politically aware—when they do receive
messages—are the most easily swayed from their predispositions (Zaller, 1992). Thus,
if the least aware receive messages, as the Proportional Model predicts, even when these
messages conflict with their self interest, I expect patterns of opinion change to reflect
elite discourse.
Attention to the opinion behavior of subgroups is particularly important because
democratic representation, at best, means politicians respond to groups. Democratic
theory does not expect that politicians incorporate the changing preferences of indi-
vidual constituents into policy. However, we might expect policy makers to catch wind
of the changing preferences of distinct groups. If a large group, such as union mem-
bers, women, or low income constituents change their policy preferences, normatively
speaking, politicians should notice and respond. Thus, when studying inequality, we
are most interested, not in whether a few individuals in any subgroup do not receive
representation but whether certain segments of the population are effectively disenfran-
chised because politicians fail to respond to the group’s changing preferences. For these
theoretical reasons, most studies of inequality and differential representation examine
the opinions of different subgroups (Bartels, 2005; Gilens, 2005; Soroka and Wlezien,
2006). The following section analyzes welfare attitudes from 1973 to 2004 to test the
Proportional Model’s prediction that each subgroup will respond at the same time and
in the same direction to elite discourse.
2.2 The End of Welfare as We Know It
Understanding attitudes toward welfare is central to understanding inequality in the
United States. Wlezien (2004) shows that when the public prefers more (or less) welfare
spending, government responds. Furthermore, Kelly (2004, 2005) shows that increased
policy liberalism leads to lower levels of inequality in the United States. Together,
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these analyses suggest that support or opposition to welfare spending directly influences
government spending on welfare and indirectly influences actual levels of inequality in
the United States.
Welfare attitudes also offer a challenging test of the Proportional Model. In the
early 1990s, elite discourse regarding welfare turned sharply negative. Prominent Re-
publicans and Democrats began speaking of the need to reform welfare. President
Clinton repeatedly promised to “end welfare as we know it.”7 Prior research has found
that only the most informed responded to these changes in elite discourse about wel-
fare (Schneider and Jacoby, 2005, 377).8 In contrast to this research, the Proportional
Model predicts that when elite discourse shifts, as with welfare in the early 1990s,
all segments of the public will respond. If the predictions of the Proportional Model
receive support, these results will revise our understanding of how individuals incorpo-
rate media messages into opinions about a “cognitively difficult issue area” like welfare
(Berinsky, 2004, 84).
Figure 2.1 offers an initial assessment of the Proportional Model. The figure plots
the proportion of positive to negative messages about welfare in major television news
broadcasts during the 1990s and the changing welfare attitudes of different segments of
society.9 The dark solid line reflects the proportion of positive messages (the Informa-
tion Stream) about welfare. A clear “V–shaped” pattern emerges, showing a decrease
in the proportion of positive stories about welfare until 1995, when 88 percent of news
7New York Times Aug. 1, 1996, Section A; Page 24; Column 1
8Schneider and Jacoby (2005) take advantage of panel data, allowing them to analyze individual
level opinion change. The disadvantage of the analysis, however, is that data limitations force them
to analyze welfare attitudes at just two time points. Furthermore, because just two time points
are examined, an actual measure of elite discourse cannot be used in the analysis. The subsequent
subgroup analyses attempt to address these potential limitations.
9The television news data, provided by Saundra K. Schneider and William G. Jacoby, come from
the Vanderbilt University Television News Archive. No values are reported for 1990 and 1991 because
only 1 welfare story was reported for 1990 and no stories for 1991.
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stories about welfare were neutral or negative. Although not shown, the percent of pos-
itive welfare stories reported in the New York Times follows the same pattern. Between
1992 and 1999, the two series correlate at r = 0.88.10
Figure 2.1 also plots the percent responding “spending too little” on welfare for
three subgroups of the population, those with at least a college degree (23.2 percent of
respondents), those with less than a high school degree (16.9 percent), and the lowest
income households (17.5 percent).11 As a point of reference, the 2004 income measure
corresponds with a household income of less than $19,999. In 2006, the eligibility
requirement for food stamps was an annual income of $17,160 for a household of two.12
Thus, the respondents in the low income group are either eligible for or bordering on
eligible for some type of federal needs based welfare program.
As the unequal voice theory predicts, cross–sectional differences emerge between
subgroups. The lowest income group consistently has the highest values, indicating
this group is the most supportive of increased welfare spending. Those with less than a
high school degree are slightly less supportive and those with a college degree or higher
10Schneider and Jacoby (2005) also provided the New York Times data.
11Throughout this paper, I follow the time series convention of coding percent liberal as the Percent
Liberal/(Percent Liberal + Percent Conservative) (Stimson, 1999, 2004). The decision to use this
formula, as opposed to simply the percent liberal or percent conservative, ensures that the time series
variables do not incorporate artifactual changes in the “don’t know” category, which would result from
even slight changes in the question filter (Stimson, 1999, 63). Using net spending preferences (e.g.
Wlezien 1995, 2004) does not change the overtime pattern or the results of the statistical analysis.
Except for 1995, the data come from the General Social Surveys (GSS). The GSS did not produce
a survey in 1995. Based on the flow of information on welfare (evident in Figure 2.1), 1995 was a
crucial year. I thus rely on a similar question asked at the same time of year the GSS is asked by the
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll (See the Appendix for precise wording). The GSS was also not
asked in 1992, 1997, and 1999. For these years, I take the average of the preceding and subsequent
years. In 1992 the CBS News/New York Times Poll asked an identical question to the GSS at the
same time of year. Responses to this question confirm that imputing a value for 1992 based on 1991
and 1993 responses is appropriate. No similar welfare questions were asked in 1997 or 1999 so there is
no way to validate this assumption. There is, however, no reason to assume that patterns of opinion
change diverged in either of these two years. Furthermore, to ensure that results are not influenced
by imputed values, all subsequent analyses are re–estimated excluding years after 1996. The results
are nearly identical.
12(http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/applicant recipients/fs Res Ben Elig.htm)
48
are the least supportive of increased welfare spending. We are most interested, however,
in opinion change. Change is what leads politicians to adjust the policy status quo. In
contrast to additive theories of message reception, which predict that the most informed
will be the most likely to respond to elite discourse, Figure 2.1 shows the three series
follow a remarkably similar pattern. Additionally, each series reflects the V-shaped
pattern of information about welfare. In the early 1990s, as the percent of positive
news stories decreases, support for welfare spending plummets. Then, beginning in
1996 when Aid to Families with Dependent Children was changed to Temporary Aid to
Needy Families, the stories about welfare return to a less negative perspective and the
percent in each group favoring welfare follows suit.13
13Berinsky (2004) shows that those most likely to support welfare are also the most likely to re-
spond “Don’t Know” to survey questions about welfare. The distribution of “Don’t Know” responses,
however, is unlikely to contribute to the parallel pattern of opinion change in Figure 2.1. First, on
average, just 4 percent of respondents responded “Don’t Know” to the questions used in the analysis.
This contrasts with the questions Berinsky examined, which ranged from nine to twenty–three per-
cent responding “Don’t Know.” Additionally, in the mid–1990s, when the most opposition to welfare
occurs, only 3 percent responded, “Don’t Know.” Another potential concern is that the similarities
in Figure 2.1 arise because I use education instead of political information level. Previous evidence
of differential opinion change focuses on level of political information (Zaller, 1992; Schneider and Ja-
coby, 2005). The GSS does not include questions which directly measure respondents’ level of political
information. Fortunately, the ANES, which does include measures of political information, has asked
a question about welfare spending six times. This is not sufficient for a time series analysis but we can
compare the over time variation to see if the responses of the most and least educated differ from the
responses of the most and least politically informed. For each year that the ANES asked about welfare
preferences, I group respondents with less than a high school education and those with a college degree
or higher. Following Zaller (1992), I then create a thirteen point index of political information. The
political information index is based on the following criteria: correctly identifying which political party
controls the House, which party controls the Senate, and correct (relative) placement of the parties on
defense spending, government service, aid to Blacks, liberal/conservative scale, guaranteed jobs, and
health care. Each correct response is coded as a one. Respondents could also get five points based
on the interviewer rating of respondent’s level of political information. The welfare attitudes of the
least educated (the lowest 13 percent of respondents) correlate with the least politically informed (the
lowest 15 percent of respondents at r = 0.98. The welfare attitude of the most educated (highest 28
percent of respondents) and the most informed (highest 21 percent of respondents) correlate at r =
0.94. Despite minor differences—education and political information are not one–in–the–same—the
strong correlations suggest that using a measure of political information (if it was available) would not
change the results.
49
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Pe
rc
en
t o
f P
o
si
tiv
e 
St
o
rie
s 
ab
o
u
t W
el
fa
re
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Pe
rc
en
t S
u
pp
o
rt
in
g 
m
o
re
 
W
el
fa
re
 
Sp
en
di
n
g
Major Television News Broadcasts
College
Low Income
Less than High School
Figure 2.1: Messages about Welfare and Welfare Attitudes, 1990–2000
2.3 Thirty Years of Welfare Attitudes
Figure 2.1 shows that not only did different subgroups update their welfare preferences
in tandem but that these changing welfare attitudes paralleled the percent of positive
stories about welfare on the television news. This pattern is precisely what the Pro-
portional Model of message reception predicts. Below, I extend the analysis from 1973
to 2004 and directly estimate the effect of media messages on welfare attitudes.
Extending the time series beyond the 1990s raises an important consideration. The
media do not always report stories on welfare with the same frequency as the period
shown in Figure 2.1. According to the Vanderbilt News Archive, the number of evening
news broadcasts about welfare peaked at 97 in 1995. In 1990, on the other hand, there
was only one story about welfare on the nightly television news. When messages about
welfare are not prevalent, individuals must use other information sources to update
their welfare attitudes. Thus, in order to estimate welfare attitudes over time, we need
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to include other Information Streams, which individuals may incorporate into their
welfare preferences. Specifically, the model must include variables that have been linked
to welfare attitudes that vary overtime. Overtime variance is crucial because we are
interested in why individuals—and as a result groups—change their welfare attitudes.14
In addition to television news stories about welfare, the analysis examines the effect of
the state of the economy, spending preferences (or Policy Mood), and attitudes toward
African Americans on attitudes toward welfare. Although the determinants of welfare
attitudes have rarely been evaluated over extended periods of time, cross–sectional
analyses consistently show that these variables influence public opinion about welfare
(Gilens, 1999; Schneider and Jacoby, 2005). Additionally, Wlezien’s (1995) time series
analysis of the public as a whole showed that welfare attitudes respond to economic
evaluations. Below, I operationalize these variables
2.3.1 Variables and Measures
The dependent variable, Welfare Attitudes, uses GSS data to extend the series reported
in Figure 2.1 from 1973 to 2004. Higher values indicate more people prefer increased
government spending on welfare. Because we are interested in how different subgroups
receive and respond to information that relates to welfare, I create a measure based
on all respondents as well as for different education and income levels. Next, we need
measures of the countervailing messages, or Information Streams, that relate to welfare.
Not everyone receives the same messages, or even the same number of messages, but I
expect the proportion of countervailing messages that individuals receive to change in
tandem.
The first Information Stream relates to the Economy. Gilens (1999, 45–52) shows
14Thus, demographic characteristics, which are often incorporated into cross–sectional analyses of
welfare attitudes are not relevant for the current analysis.
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that during economic hard times support for welfare spending increases. I use the
annual Unemployment rate as a measure of messages about economic conditions.15 I do
not expect individuals to know the actual unemployment rate. But rather, the changing
unemployment rate serves as a proxy for the changing balance of positive and negative
messages about the economy presented by the media. When the unemployment rate
increases, the proportion of negative economic news should increase, leading to more
support for welfare spending. For each subgroup, I expect a positive and significant
relationship. This result will support the expectation that all segments of the public
translate changing economic information into their welfare attitudes.
The second Information Stream includes the proportion of positive to negativeWel-
fare Messages in the media. I use the series depicted in Figure 2.1 as the measure of
Welfare Messages. Unfortunately, the series does not extend beyond the 1990s. This
limitation means that it is not possible to estimate the effect of messages about welfare
on welfare attitudes at the beginning or very end of the time series.16 For years when
welfare was not a salient issue in the media this is not a problem. When welfare was not
a salient issue there is no reason to expect that the few available stories about welfare
would influence welfare attitudes. Of course, a full time series would be preferable but
the series does allow us to estimate the effect of messages about about welfare on wel-
fare attitudes during the critical welfare debate of the 1990s. Again, I expect a positive
and significant relationship. This is not to say that all individuals will respond to elite
discourse. But those that do update their attitudes will reflect the changing balance of
15I measure the unemployment rate as the percent of labor force that is unemployed (U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aat1.
txt).
16As an empirical matter, I code all values prior to 1992 equal to the actual 1992 value and all values
after 2000 equal to the 2000 value. By creating a constant value before and after the available data
series, I ensure that the model only estimates the relationship between Welfare Messages and Welfare
Attitudes for the years when data are available.
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positive and negative messages, leading net change to reflect the changing Information
Stream.
The model also controls for respondents’ general spending preferences. Gilens (1999,
84) shows that support for “government spending to redress social ills” or “an oppo-
sition to government activism” influences welfare attitudes. Jacoby (2000) also shows
that, at least cross–sectionally, individuals maintain coherently structured orientations
toward government spending on welfare–related policies. Stimson’s (1991, 1999) Policy
Mood provides the best overtime measure of preferences for government spending and
activism. Stimson’s measure cannot be used in the current analysis, however, because
it is based on fully aggregated data. Respondents need to be grouped according to
education and income level. Prior research shows that the GSS spending items can
be used to create a proxy for Stimson’s Policy Mood (Ellis, Ura and Robinson, 2006;
Stimson, 2002; Ura and Ellis, 2007). I use thirteen questions (detailed in the Appendix)
to create a time series measure of spending preferences for each subgroup. Consistent
with previous research, I refer to this measure as Policy Mood. Importantly, I do not
include two standard spending preference items: spending on welfare and spending on
race. These items are kept out of this measure of Policy Mood to avoid collinearity
with other variables in the model. As individuals’ Policy Mood moves in a liberal direc-
tion, in favor of more government spending, support for welfare spending is expected
to increase.
Racial Liberalism, a measure of attitudes toward African Americans, represents the
final control variable. Despite the fact that African Americans represent only about a
third of welfare recipients, individuals’ attitudes toward African Americans influences
their welfare attitudes (Gilens, 1995, 1999).17 Scholars have used a variety of survey
17From October 2004 to September 2005, the percent receiving Temporary Aid to Needy Families
was as follows: 25.5 percent Hispanic, 32.1 percent White, 37.1 percent African American, and 5.2
percent other (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/character/FY2005/tab08.htm).
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questions to tap the public’s Attitudes toward African Americans. Gilens (1999, 83)
uses two question items, which ask respondents how well the terms “hardworking” and
“lazy” describe “blacks as a group.” In other work, Gilens (1995) has found that ques-
tions about whether respondents blame blacks for inequality or whether government
should insure equal opportunity for everyone predict welfare attitudes. Schneider and
Jacoby (2005) use respondents’ rating of “Blacks” on the NES 100 point feeling ther-
mometer scale. None of these question items, however, has been asked enough times
to provide an adequate time–series measure of the public’s attitudes toward African
Americans. Fortunately, Kellstedt (2000) offers a potential solution. Kellstedt uses
Stimson’s dyad ratios algorithm to combine nineteen different time–series survey items
about racial policy preferences into one overall measure of the public’s attitude toward
racial policy. This methodology (which scales each series to a common metric and
then uses a factor analytic approach to extract the common variance among survey
questions) rests on the intuition that if similarly worded question items tap common
underlying attitudes about racial policy preferences, the variance that is common across
all of the indicators will reflect the underlying latent attitude.18 The same logic can be
applied to the public’s attitudes toward African Americans. The key, then, is to find
a variety survey questions that are likely indicators of the public’s attitudes toward
African Americans and that have been asked over an extended period of time.
18Documentation for Stimson’s Dyad Ratios Algorithm, used to compute the Racial Liberalism
index, is available at http://www.unc.edu/∼jstimson. I use Stimson’s algorithm with the exponential
smoothing function turned off. The algorithm is designed to extract the underlying dimension of
common survey question items. Random survey responses detract from the “true” nature of series
over time, so generally the smoothing function is used to attenuate random error. However, a potential
difference between the most and least educated is that the least educated will have more random
responses. Smoothing across responses, while creating a more accurate picture of the overall electorate,
could potentially create false similarities between sophistication levels. The smoothing function was
thus turned off for all analyses to ensure that any similarities between sophistication levels exist in the
raw data.
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I use six questions that reflect perceptions of African Americans. The indicators in-
clude questions about busing, integration, characteristics of African Americans, and the
ANES 100 point feeling thermometer about African Americans. No question was asked
at every time point, but each question was asked enough times to create a complete time
series. I select these six questions because they satisfy three criteria for inclusion. Each
question was asked repeatedly over time, relates to attitudes toward African Americans,
and the individual–level data are available. Without individual–level data, attitudes
cannot be disaggregated by education and income level.19 I do not include questions
that ask about preferences for government spending on African Americans. Omitting
these questions ensures that the measure of Racial Liberalism reflects attitudes toward
African Americans and not attitudes toward spending on African Americans. As with
Policy Mood, I create a measure for all respondents and for each subgroup.
2.3.2 Analysis and Results
I model welfare attitudes as a single equation Error Correction Model (ECM). An
ECM offers several advantages for the current analysis. First, the dependent variable
is differenced, making it possible to estimate the determinants of change in welfare
attitudes. Why different segments of the population change their attitudes is the focus
of the analysis. Differencing the dependent variable also avoids the danger of estimating
a spurious regression with near-integrated data (DeBoef and Granato, 1997).20 Finally,
ECMs model short and long term causal effects. Estimating both short– and long–term
effects provides a more complete picture of the effects of media messages on public
19Table A–1, in the Appendix, shows that for each subgroup, the individual question items correlate
highly with the overall index and the composite series explain a majority of the variance of the specific
indicators.
20An augmented Dickey–Fuller test suggests the dependent variable is either an integrated or near–
integrated time series.
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opinion than other time series models (Keele and DeBoef, 2004).
Table 2.1 shows the determinants of changes in welfare attitudes for different seg-
ments of the population from 1973 to 2004.21 The first four rows report the short
term or contemporaneous effects of the predictor variables. These coefficients should
be interpreted as a the expected change in the percent supporting welfare spending for
each unit change in the independent variable. The next four rows report the Long–
Term Effects. A statistically significant long–term effect suggests that an equilibrium
relationship exists between the independent and dependent variable. In other words, a
shift in the independent variable leads to a shift in welfare attitudes at a future time
point. The Error Correction Rate (Welfare Attitudest−1) indicates how quickly any
long–term effects take place. Specifically, this coefficient indicates the percent of the
long–term effect (if one exists), which takes place in each subsequent time period.
The first column of Table 2.1 reports the results for the analysis of all respondents.
Although, the test of the Proportional Model relates to how different subgroups up-
date their opinions, the fully aggregated results provide important insight into why
the public, as a whole, supports more or less welfare spending. All of the estimated
short–term effects are statistically significant. In other words, a change in each of the
independent variables leads to an expected contemporaneous change in the percent of
the public supporting increased or decreased welfare spending. As expected, when the
21After 1994, the GSS switched to conducting the survey every other year. As a result, for every odd
year after 1994 the dependent variable is missing data. As discussed earlier, I use a nearly identical
welfare question from the NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll for 1995, but after 1996, odd years have
to be estimated by averaging the prior and following year. To ensure that these imputed values do
not influence the findings, I conduct the same analysis from 1973 to 1996. All statistically significant
relationships remain significant with the shortened time series. Another estimation decision relates to
estimating the hypothesized relationships for distinct subgroups. Because each model includes the same
right hand side variables (although the respondents differ for each subgroup) and the variable measures
come from the same datasets, the error terms are likely to be correlated across equations. Thus, it
might be more efficient to estimate the equations simultaneously, using Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly
Unrelated Regression Equation (SUR) model. Estimating the equations simultaneously does not
change any of the statistically significant coefficients. If anything, the strength of the statistically
significant relationships increases with the SUR analysis.
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public’s spending preferences move in a liberal direction, support for welfare spending
increases. The 16 percent increase in Policy Mood liberalism that occurred between
President Reagan’s first and last year in office predicts a 43.7 percent increase in the
percent of the public responding that the government is spending “too little” on wel-
fare. Importantly, even controlling for the public’s changing spending preferences, both
Information Streams about welfare, News Stories and the Unemployment rate, exert a
substantively important influence on welfare attitudes. For example, the thirty percent
decrease in the percent of positive stories about welfare between 1992 and 1995 predict
over a sixteen percent decrease in the percent supporting welfare spending. Similarly,
when the public perceives economic good (bad) times, support for welfare spending
decreases (increases). The 3.5 percent decrease in unemployment during the Clinton
Presidency predicts over a ten percent decrease in support for welfare spending. The
relationship between Racial Liberalism and welfare attitudes is also positive and sig-
nificant. Thus, controlling for other variables, the overall pattern during the last thirty
years toward more liberal racial attitudes predicts more liberal welfare attitudes.22 On
the other hand, increases in racial conservatism, such as the 2.6 percent shift between
1993 and 1994 or the 3 percent shift from 2000 to 2002, each predict around a 2 percent
decrease in support for welfare spending.
Policy Mood and News Stories also produce a long term effect on welfare attitudes.
That is, in addition to the contemporaneous effect, shifts in these variables have an
effect on welfare attitudes at future time points. The unemployment rate also appears
to exert a long–term effect on welfare attitudes, but in the opposite direction as expected
22It is, of course, impossible to assess how much of the increased racial liberalism during the last
30 years reflects a true change in the public’s attitudes toward African Americans and how much
the increase reflects insincere responses, which result from social desirability bias. Increased racial
liberalism, as a result of social desirability bias, would, however, attenuate the overtime ups and
downs in actual racial liberalism. It is thus likely that the coefficient is a conservative estimate of the
effect of racial liberalism on welfare attitudes.
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(p<.05; two–tailed test). The negative coefficient suggests that the public may “over–
react” to news about the economy and then readjust its attitudes in the opposite
direction at future time points. This long–term relationship serves to attenuate the
overall impact of changes in the unemployment rate. The error correction rate is .58,
suggesting that 58 percent of the long term effects take place at each successive time
point. Together, the short and long term effects explain an impressive 84 percent of
the variation in changing welfare attitudes during the last thirty years.
The second column analyzes the determinants of welfare attitudes for those with a
college degree or higher. According to the additive view, this segment of the population
should be the most likely to receive and thus respond to relevant messages. Similarly,
the theory of unequal voice, which contends that social elites dominate politicians’
attention, would expect systematic opinion change from this segment of the population.
For the most educated segment of society, the predictions of the Proportional Model
do not differ for these perspectives.
As expected, the contemporaneous relationships between Policy Mood, Welfare Mes-
sages, and Unemployment are all significant and in the expected direction. Further-
more, the coefficients are of similar magnitude to the coefficients of all respondents. The
only insignificant contemporaneous effect is Racial Liberalism. The lack of relationship
does not automatically mean that the most educated do not receive messages about
race. More likely, as a group, the most educated do not incorporate their changing
attitudes about African Americans into their welfare attitudes. The long–term effect
of Policy Mood is also significant. Consistent with expectations, the determinants of
the welfare attitudes of the most educated segment of society largely parallel those of
the public as a whole.
Columns three and four present the results for the least educated 23 percent of
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Table 2.1: Determinants of Change in Welfare Attitudes, 1973–2004
Short–Term Effects All College Less H.S. Low Income
∆ Policy Mood 2.73** 2.58** 2.39** 1.20**
(0.32) (0.42) (0.47) (0.30)
∆ News Stories 0.54** 0.51* 0.59** 0.85**
(0.12) (0.22) (0.21) (0.27)
∆ Unemployment 2.9** 3.0* 2.4* 3.9*
(0.60) (1.3) (1.1) (1.6)
∆ Racial Liberalism 0.74** 0.32 0.47* -0.004
(0.24) (0.42) (0.23) (0.395)
Long–Term Effects
Policy Moodt−1 0.55** 1.38** 0.42 0.90*
(0.21) (0.47) (0.39) (0.45)
News Storiest−1 0.26* 0.28 0.15 0.42
(0.12) (0.18) (0.20) (0.26)
Unemploymentt−1 -1.3w -1.5 -1.2 (0.9
(0.60) (1.0) (1.0) (1.4)
Racial Liberalismt−1 -0.13 -0.22 -0.07 -0.097
(0.11) (0.22) (0.19) (0.262)
Error Correction Rate
Welfare Attitudest−1 -0.58** -0.71** -0.50* -0.64**
(0.14) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Constant -0.18 -0.72* -0.06 -0.60
(0.18) (0.41) (0.29) (0.37)
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.67 0.68 0.53
Avg. Pct. of Respondents 100 19.7 23.4 18.4
Note: N = 31 for all analyses; Standard errors in parentheses
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01 one–tailed tests; w = wrong direction
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respondents (those with less than a high school degree) and the lowest income 18 per-
cent of respondents. These ansalyses test the Proportional Model. While additive
theories of message reception predict limited—if any—opinion response, the Propor-
tional Model predicts parallel opinion change; even if responsiveness conflicts with
self–interest. For those with less than a high school degree, the contemporaneous rela-
tionship between each of the independent variables and welfare attitudes is statistically
significant. Most importantly for the Proportional Model, the least educated, as a
group, translate changes in messages about welfare and the economy into their welfare
attitudes. These relationships exist, controlling for Policy Mood and Racial Liberalism,
both of which are statistically significant. With the exception of Racial Liberalism, the
relationships for the lowest income group (reported in column four) are the same. Fur-
thermore, although the magnitude of the coefficient for Policy Mood is smaller than
the other subgroups, the effect of News stories and the unemployment rate is larger
than even the most educated subgroup. Different from the expectations of the Unequal
Voice theory, the most disadvantaged do not consistently support welfare. Instead, this
segment of society is remarkably responsive to the changing proportion of countervail-
ing political and economic messages. As a result, when elite discourse turns against
welfare, as it did during the early 1990s, the opinion signal coming from the least edu-
cated and the lowest income group—the only message politicians could be expected to
respond to—was for less spending on welfare.
The previous analysis focuses on the changing attitudes of distinct subgroups be-
cause it is groups, not individuals, to which politicians respond. Indeed, the theory of
unequal voice does not contend that certain individual preferences are not heard, but
that the most socially disadvantaged, as a group, do not receive equal representation.
Nevertheless, theoretically, it is important to consider how much of the opinion respon-
siveness in the above analysis results from aggregating responses across subgroups.
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Because panel data do not exist, it is not possible to estimate how specific individu-
als changed their attitudes during the three decade period of analysis. It is possible,
however, to examine the opinions of an even smaller segment of the population. I
re–estimated the model, only including the least educated ten percent of respondents
(those who did not go beyond elementary school). Decreasing the size of the subgroup
carries the consequence of increasing the margin of error. The increased margin of error
will attenuate any relationships making it more difficult for statistically significant re-
lationships to emerge. Nevertheless, the effect of Welfare Messages remains significant
(p < .05) and the magnitude of the coefficient (0.66) is larger than the other education
subgroups. Although it is still inappropriate to make any inferences about how many
individuals responded to welfare messages, we can conclude that as a group, those
with only an elementary school education responded to elite discourse about welfare
during the 1990s. Another important finding from the Elementary School analysis is
that changes in Policy Mood still predict changes in welfare attitudes (p < .01). One
of the dominant themes of public opinion research during the last fifty years has been
the inconsistency between individuals’ survey responses on related topics (Converse,
1964; Sniderman and Bullock, 2004). This analysis, however, shows impressive lev-
els of attitude constraint within the public. Even for those with only an elementary
school education, government spending preferences and welfare spending preferences
move synchronously.
2.4 Conclusions and Implications
This paper advances our understanding of public opinion and inequality in the United
States. The public opinion literature remains skeptical about the ability of the least
informed to respond to survey questions in a meaningful way; they simply do not
pay enough attention to public affairs to register meaningful political attitudes (e.g.,
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Converse 1990, 282, Glynn et al. 2004, 345–346, Sniderman and Bullock 2004, 337–338,
Zaller 1992, 16). The Proportional Model, however, predicts that it is the proportion—
not the number—of messages received that matters for opinion change. Even those
tuned out to politics should sense when elite discourse has shifted in a positive or
negative direction. At least for attitudes toward welfare, this is the case.
The evidence that all segments of the public respond to changes in elite discourse
should not, however, be automatically interpreted as normatively positive. Repre-
sentative democracy demands that the voice of the disadvantaged receive the same
attention as the voice of the advantaged—a condition that does not always exist in
the United States (Bartels, 2005; Gilens, 2005). However, the above analysis suggests
that increasing their political voice will not be sufficient to improve the conditions
of the disadvantaged. Although the most and least disadvantaged increase their sup-
port for welfare during economic hard times, both groups decrease support for welfare
when unemployment declines. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, when elite discourse
turned against welfare, even the least educated and lowest income respondents updated
their attitudes—seemingly against their own self–interest—to support less government
spending on welfare. During these periods, if politicians respond to the changing public
opinion, equal political voice will reduce support for redistributive policies.
Chapter 3
How the Economy affects the
Public’s Policy Mood
Abstract: This paper presents evidence that both micro (individual level)
and macro (aggregate level) theories of public opinion overstate the impor-
tance of political sophistication for opinion change. I argue that even the
least politically sophisticated segment of society receives messages about the
economy and uses this information to update attitudes about political is-
sues. To test this hypothesis, I use General Social Survey data to construct a
31–item measure of Policy Mood, disaggregated by political sophistication,
that spans from 1972 to 2004. The analysis shows that all subgroups gen-
erally change opinion at the same time, in the same direction, and to about
the same extent. Furthermore, the different sophistication levels change
opinions for predominantly the same reasons.
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During the last half century, political scientists have significantly modified their
portrayal of political attitudes in the United States. Macro–level analyses of public
opinion demonstrate that despite the inconsistent and uninformed attitudes of most
citizens (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), aggregate public opinion be-
haves in systematic and coherent ways. Furthermore, when aggregate public opinion
changes, the government responds. Preferences for a more liberal or more conserv-
ative government yield policy shifts in the same direction (Page and Shapiro, 1983,
1992; Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, 1995; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002).
The connection between public opinion, or “Policy Mood” (Stimson 1991; 1999), and
policy change suggests impressive levels of representation in America. Erikson, MacK-
uen, and Stimson (2002) show that the public’s Mood—an aggregate measure of the
public’s preferences for more or less government—influences all branches of U.S. gov-
ernment. Possibly even more striking than this opinion–policy linkage is the evidence
that all sophistication levels update their policy Mood in tandem (Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson 2002, 212–219; Stimson 2002). Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002,
219) write, “The better educated move more than do others, but [opinion] movement
seems to come from all strata of American society.”
Evidence that the least sophisticated change opinions systematically and in concert
with the most sophisticated segment of society challenges the dominant theories of pub-
lic opinion. This finding even challenges Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson’s theoretical
expectations. They begin The Macro Polity by stating, “Those at the low end of the
[information] scale have little input on aggregate movement; those at the high end have
major input. The net result is that the more informed, thoughtful, and attentive citi-
zens contribute disproportionately to aggregate movement” (5). This statement, while
completely consistent with micro (individual) level and macro (aggregate) level theo-
ries of opinion change, contradicts their empirical findings of “uniformity of preference
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change” across sophistication levels (219). Page and Shapiro (1992, Ch.7) also find
evidence that the most and least informed subgroups update their opinions in tandem.
They note, the “few differential trends among education groups suggests that individual
differences in [message] exposure and acceptance, while theoretically interesting, may
not ordinarily play a large part in the process of collective opinion change” (316). My
goal is to examine the public’s policy Mood and explain why differences in exposure to
and acceptance of political information do not influence opinion change.
In addition to being of theoretical interest, the question of who moves Mood—
and why—is essentially about whom politicians represent when they respond to public
opinion. Because Mood has been linked to shifts in public policy, we need to understand
the ways that different subgroups contribute to the over–all trajectory of Mood. This
paper begins by offering a brief overview of the opinion literature, which illustrates
the incongruence between current opinion theory and Page and Shapiro’s (1992) and
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s (2002) finding of “parallel publics.” I then outline a
set of theoretical expectations that predict that all segments of the population receive
common messages about the economy and use this information to update their political
attitudes. Although the most sophisticated will be more likely to incorporate additional
information into their opinions, I expect to find similar patterns of opinion change and
similar causal dynamics across sophistication levels. The analysis proceeds in two parts.
First, I replicate and extend Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s findings to be sure that
different sophistication levels indeed update their opinions in unison. I then evaluate
the causal dynamics of opinion change for each sophistication level. The results strongly
confirm expectations. The Mood of the most and least sophisticated segments of society
generally changes at the same time, in the same direction, and for the same reasons.
In contrast to the dominant literature on economic evaluations (e.g. Aidt 2000, Krause
& Granato 1998), all sophistication levels translate economic ups and downs into their
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political attitudes.
These findings offer three insights into the nature of public opinion change and
representation in the United States. First, contrary to the theoretical expectations of
micro and macro opinion scholars, the attitudes of the most and least sophisticated tend
to change at the same time for the same reasons. Second, this finding suggests that
the least informed contribute much more to aggregate opinion, and thus government
response, than previously thought. Finally, the strong connection between the economy
and Mood across sophistication levels suggests that simple economic messages have a
profound effect on public opinion.
3.1 Public Opinion and Political Awareness
The finding that all sophistication levels update their attitudes in a similar manner
conflicts sharply with most public opinion literature. Over half a century of scholarship
shows that an individual’s level of political sophistication affects his or her survey
response and that large portions of the public fail to display any notion of ideology or
attitude constraint (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and
Gaudet, 1948).1 Since these early works, public opinion scholars have continued to
1Political sophistication is a broad term in the political science literature. Luskin (1990, 335) defines
political sophistication as a function of three elements: (1) level of exposure to political information;
(2) intellectual ability to retain and organize the encountered information; and (3) motivation to obtain
and comprehend the political information. Zaller (1992, 21) substitutes the term political awareness
for political sophistication but offers a similar definition. He writes, “Political awareness...refers to
the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has
encountered.” Conceptually, I agree with these definitions of political sophistication. Operationally, I
am limited by the available time series data. Education level and vocabulary score are the only available
measures of political sophistication across time. Fortunately, education level correlates highly with
political sophistication (Althaus, 2003). Converse (1974, 730) concludes that education is “probably
the prime predictor of dependent variables reflecting political interest, participation, and mobilization.”
Alvarez and Brehm (2002, 37,45) use education level as one of their measures of chronic information
and political sophistication. Luskin (1990) questions the causal relationship between education level
and political sophistication, but suggests that the correlation exists because of the strong relationship
between education and intelligence, occupation, and interest in politics.
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document the effects of political sophistication on public opinion (e.g. Bartels 1994,
Converse 2000, Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996, Druckman 2005, Schneider & Jacoby 2005,
Sniderman 1993, Sniderman & Bullock 2004, Zaller 1992). Zaller’s (1992) “Receive–
Accept–Sample” model of survey response, for example, places political sophistication
central to both message reception and the likelihood of accepting the received message.
According to Zaller, “The greater the person’s awareness, the greater his or her
chances of receiving—that is, being exposed to and comprehending—a given change-
inducing message” (148). In addition to being more likely to receive information, the
most politically aware are best equipped to compare new information to their predis-
positions and decide whether or not to accept that new information as correct. The
relationship of political sophistication to message reception and resistance creates mul-
tiple expectations for opinion change. Depending on whether messages are conflicting
or uniform, either the middle tier of sophisticates or the most sophisticated may be
most likely to change survey responses. The least sophisticated, on the other hand,
generally do not receive any information that might influence political attitudes. As
Zaller explains,
At the other end of the attentiveness spectrum is a larger group of people
who possess almost no current information about politics. In late 1986,
for example, when George Bush was halfway into his second term as vice–
president of the United States, 24 percent of the general public either failed
to recognize his name or could not say what office he held. People at
this level of inattentiveness can have only the haziest idea of the policy
alternatives about which pollsters regularly ask them to state opinions, and
such ideas as they do have must often be relatively innocent of the effects
of exposure to elite discourse (125–126).
Thus, Zaller’s RAS model is consistent with the expectation that the survey responses
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of the least sophisticated do not contribute to observed patterns of opinion change
across time.2
Macro–level research (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002; Page and Shapiro,
1992) extends this notion of the largely uninformed electorate to explain the micro–
macro paradox—that is, why aggregate public opinion moves coherently even though
individual opinion is largely unconstrained and uninformed. This research argues that
opinion change for the least sophisticated is mostly random and cancels out upon
aggregation. As a result, the aggregate signal represents only the opinion change of
the most sophisticated. Converse (1990, 382) explains, “[T]he drawing of means hides
a sea of noise in these placements, as aggregation always does. The signal extracted
from this noise is very recognizable because it is undoubtedly shaped in large measure
by the small minority of the electorate that is nearly as well informed about these
matters as our elite informants.” According to the macro scholars, if opinion change was
disaggregated by sophistication level, the opinions of the most sophisticated would move
systematically, the least sophisticated would be random movement, and the middle tier
would be in between. As Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, 428–429) conclude,
“We concur with the usual empirical assessments regarding the bleak distribution of
political awareness, interest, and sophistication within the American electorate... Our
claim instead is that macro–level dynamics are driven by an electorate, where in the
aggregate, the more politically capable citizens possess dominant influence.”
2It is important to note that with easy messages—Zaller’s example is a person who “stands in front
of a large audience an repeats suggestively, ‘Your head is moving back and forth, back and forth”’
(1992, 125)—the least informed might demonstrate the most responsiveness.
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3.2 The Role of the Economy
As illustrated above, the overwhelming evidence that less sophisticated individuals are
uniformed about politics and ideologically inconsistent in their survey responses (both
cross–sectionally and across time) has led most opinion scholars to conclude that the
least sophisticated do not receive or respond to messages that relate to their political
attitudes. In contrast to the dominant theories of public opinion, Page and Shapiro
(1992) and Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) have provided evidence of uniform
opinion change. I construct and test a theory of why the least politically sophisticated
segment of society should change opinions roughly in tandem with the middle and most
sophisticated individuals. Specifically, I argue that all segments of the electorate receive
information about the economy and then use this information to update their political
attitudes.
Research shows that policy Mood, as a whole, responds to changes in the econ-
omy (Durr, 1993; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002). In the aggregate, individuals
translate economic ups and downs into conservative and liberal attitudes toward gov-
ernment. Scholars dispute, however, the ability of the least sophisticated to receive
economic messages and translate this information into political attitudes. Not only
do individuals consistently describe the economy inaccurately, but the least educated
also tend to make the most error prone assessments (Aidt, 2000; Conover, Feldman and
Knight, 1987; Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000; Holbrook and Garand, 1996). Sizeable
evidence also suggests that the general public, especially the least sophisticated segment
of the population, cannot accurately forecast economic changes (Conover, Feldman and
Knight, 1987; Krause, 1997; Krause and Granato, 1998). Even Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson conclude, “Political reactions based on the economy, for instance, are based
on the collective information of those who do hold economic knowledge, not the unpre-
dictability of uninformed actors responding in isolation” (447).
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I contend, however, that using economic information to update political attitudes
does not require attention to, or the ability to recall, specific details. Instead, all that
is necessary is a vague notion of whether the economy is getting “better” or “worse.”
In terms of identifying the ups and downs of the economy, an individual who can recall
a variety of economic details has only a minimal advantage over a person who hears,
in passing, that unemployment is down, or a person who notices that gas prices have
increased, or even a person who notices that the cigarettes on the sidewalk have been
smoked down to the butt.3 DeBoef and Kellstedt (2004) establish that individuals often
over– or under–estimate the state of the economy. Nevertheless, all segments of the
public should notice the ups and downs. Consistent with this expectation, Conover,
Feldman and Knight (1986) and Parker-Stephen and MacKuen (2005) demonstrate that
even when specific economic information is not retained, individuals demonstrate some
capacity to absorb knowledge of the general trend. Thus, while many studies have
shown that the most sophisticated provide the most accurate economic assessments
and forecasts, it is reasonable to expect that all segments of the public notice general
increases and decreases in unemployment and inflation. Furthermore, the economy is
a relatively easy cue or heuristic to use to update political attitudes; economic news
is pervasive. There is no reason to expect that the least sophisticated rely on this
heuristic less than the most sophisticated.
Importantly, these theoretical expectations do not preclude the possibility that the
most sophisticated incorporate information beyond the economy into their political at-
titudes, or that they use economic information more effectively. My contention is that
the least sophisticated get enough economic information to update their policy Mood.
Before analyzing this hypothesis, however, it is worth considering why—if the dynamics
3In Rolling Nowhere: Riding the Rails with America’s Hoboes, Ted Conover describes “Steamtrain”
Maury Graham, who claimed to be able to tell how the nation’s economy was doing by the length of
the cigarette butts he found on the sidewalk (Conover, 1984, 9).
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of opinion change are the same across sophistication levels—decades of individual level
research shows that individuals’ survey responses are unconstrained cross–sectionally
and across time. Two considerations help to reconcile this conflict. First, to the extent
that survey responses reflect primed or “top of the head” considerations (e.g. Zaller
1992, Zaller and Feldman 1992), individuals’ survey responses may exaggerate atti-
tudinal inconsistencies. For example, suppose an individual is asked about spending
preferences on a variety of domestic issues. If two of the responses reflect a recently
primed consideration and the rest of the responses reflect the respondent’s underlying
attitude toward domestic spending, the fluctuation across responses will appear to be a
lack of ideological constraint. A small number of unsystematic primed responses would
make consistent underlying attitudes appear unconstrained. Second, the lack of cor-
relation in individuals’ survey responses across time (e.g. Converse 1964) may not be
entirely the result of “non–attitudes.” In fact, evidence of systematic opinion change
requires a correlation of less than r = 1.0 across time. Certainly, not all fluctuations in
survey responses reflect systematic opinion change, but some of the longitudinal vari-
ance might. These ideas are not new; they stem directly from the logic of aggregation
theory and macro opinion research (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Erikson, MacKuen and
Stimson, 2002). I have simply extended this logic to show that individual level research
may conceal the prevalence of systematic opinion change in the electorate. Subgroups
are thus the focus of this analysis.
3.3 Research Design and Data
Before evaluating the hypothesis that all segments of the public respond to changes in
the economy, I first attempt to replicate Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s (2002) and
Stimson’s (2002) findings that Mood changes in tandem across sophistication levels.
Since the aim is to subdivide the public according to levels of political sophistication,
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Stimson’s original Mood measure, which relies on fully aggregated survey marginals,
cannot be used in the current context. Individual level data are necessary to divide
respondents into subgroups. Following Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, I look to the
General Social Surveys data. Some of the longest series in the entire Mood database
come from the GSS, which have been conducted on nearly an annual basis since 1972.
Many of these items have been asked in over twenty of the GSS surveys. With the GSS
cumulative file, obtaining time series for these indicators of Mood sub–aggregated by
varying levels of sophistication becomes possible. Whereas analyses on fully aggregated
data can begin in the vicinity of 1950, the following analyses will be limited to the period
after 1972. For each stratum of the electorate, I construct a Mood–like index using 31
items from the GSS, from 1972 to 2004.4 The items, which are described in full in the
Appendix, vary rather substantially in their content from an item about affirmative
action to items about taxes and helping the poor. The list, however, is dominated
by the extensive and familiar battery of spending items, which ask the respondent to
decide whether the government is spending too much, too little, or about the right
amount on particular things like the environment, health care, assistance to blacks,
and many others. In short, the GSS asked a sufficient variety of questions in a regular
fashion over a three–decade span to make sub-aggregate analyses possible. None of the
questions was asked every year, but many of them were asked over twenty times.
As a preliminary matter, to ensure that the GSS–based measure of Mood accurately
mirrors Stimson’s Mood series, I compute a GSS–based Mood index for the fully ag-
gregated population. Following Stimson, I take the percent giving a liberal answer and
divide it by the percent giving a liberal answer plus the percent giving a conservative
4Because the vocabulary test was not administered every year, analyses based on this criterion will
span the years 1974–2004.
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answer. Then, using Stimson’s (1999) dyadic–ratios algorithm, I construct a fully ag-
gregated GSS-based Mood index.5 Figure 3.1 compares the 31-item Mood index used
in the subsequent analyses with Stimson’s (1991, 1999) measure of Mood. The visual
similarities combined with the correlation of r = 0.85, suggest that the two series are
indeed measuring the name broad concept of public policy mood.
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of Stimson’s Mood with 31-item GSS Mood Index, 1972 to
2004
The next task is to determine how to sub–divide the electorate into varying levels of
sophistication using the criteria available in the GSS. To measure political sophistication
in the GSS for every year between 1972 and 2004, we need measures of sophistication
in each of those years. The GSS has asked some questions about factual information—
such as the name of the governor of the respondent’s state, and the name of his or her
representative in the U.S. House—but only in the year 1987. Again, I follow the lead of
5The algorithm first scales each series to a common metric and then uses a factor analytic approach
to extract the common variance among survey questions to create the overall index. See Stimson (1999,
133-137) and http://www.unc.edu/∼jstimson for complete documentation.
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Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson and rely on two complementary indicators that were
asked more regularly and are surely correlated with any ideal measure of sophistication:
educational attainment and the sum of a person’s score on the GSS 10–item vocabulary
test. For both variables, I have divided respondents in each year into three groups—
high, middle, and low. For educational attainment, I define “high” as those respondents
with a college diploma (or more); “middle” as those with a high–school diploma, but
not a college diploma; and “low” as those who did not finish high school. For the
vocabulary test, those with scores between 7 and 10 correct (out of 10) are considered
“high,” those with 5 or 6 correct are “middle,” and those with 0 to 4 correct are “low.”6
After grouping respondents into these categories, following the same process as with
overall Mood, I create a Mood index for each sophistication level.
3.4 Who Moves Mood?
It is now possible to replicate Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s sub–aggregate analysis.
My measure of Mood adds 21 additional question items and extends their series by 10
years, but the pattern of results confirms their findings. Figure 3.2 displays the series for
the three categories of verbal ability.7 Higher scores represent a more liberal public, and
lower scores a more conservative one. The series are strikingly (though not perfectly)
similar. Importantly, each series clearly resembles Stimson’s Mood series.8 Each begins
its trajectory headed in a conservative direction, and hits a conservative nadir near the
6Clearly, the dividing points for the vocabulary test are somewhat arbitrary. I selected these values
because they divide the public, roughly, into three equal parts, and are the most stable in terms of
their sizes from year to year.
7To ensure that I have not created an artificial stability where none truly exists, all of the figures and
analyses in this paper were conducted with the exponential smoothing feature of Stimson’s algorithm
turned off.
8The time periods under consideration are different, however, because the GSS data begin in 1972,
while Stimson’s series, which does not require individual level data, extends to the 1950s.
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end of the 1970s. The 1980s, however, witness a steady rebound toward a more liberal
public, peaking at or near 1990. The early 1990s find something of a retreat in a
conservative direction, hitting a conservative mini–peak around 1994, when President
Clinton was rebuked in the mid–term elections. Subsequent years have produced a
slowly but steadily more liberal public.
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Figure 3.2: Mood Indices for Three Vocabulary Strata, 1974 to 2004
Table 3.1 shows the correlations between the three series, and the results there are
consistent with our visual impressions. The strongest relationship (r = 0.92) is found
between the two groups with the highest levels of verbal ability. The weakest correla-
tion, though far from weak at r = 0.71, is between the highest and lowest groupings.
Thus, instead of no movement or random movement as much public opinion literature
predicts, I find—as did Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson—impressive levels of system-
atic movement among the least sophisticated. The first impression, then, is that the
ebbs and flows of a national Mood are not confined to the information elites or to those
in the middle. Even the least sophisticated seem to contribute to the shifting tide of
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Mood.
Table 3.1: Correlations Between Mood Indices for Three Vocabulary Sub-
strata, 1974–2004
Vocabulary Score
Vocabulary Score 0 - 4 5 - 6 7 - 10
0 - 4 1.00
5 - 6 0.88 1.00
7 - 10 0.71 0.92 1.00
Note: All correlations have an N = 31, and all are
statistically significant.
Again, consistent with Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s findings, breaking the
public down according to educational–attainment produces a nearly identical outcome.
The results of those analyses can be seen in Figure 3.3, below. As was the case with
the different verbal ability groupings, the policy attitudes of portions of the electorate
with different educational attainment move roughly in tandem. The familiar pattern
of a conservative nadir just before 1980 is there, as is the liberal peak around 1990, the
brief conservatism until the mid–1990s, and the drift again toward liberalism near the
end of the series. For those without a high school diploma, this pattern is least clear,
but still visible. The two different conceptualizations of political sophistication serve
to validate one another, confirming Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s conclusion that
shifts in the electorate’s Mood are a function of all segments of the electorate moving
more or less in tandem.
Table 3.2 displays the correlations between the three series in Figure 3.3 and the
findings mimic those in Table 3.1. The over–time correlation in Mood for the highest
and middle educational categories is r = 0.92, and the two series, visually, are virtu-
ally indistinguishable. The correlation drops substantially, however, when it involves
those on the lowest end of the educational spectrum. Between the lowest and highest
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Figure 3.3: Mood Indices for Three Educational Strata, 1972 to 2004
categories, their Mood indices correlate at r = 0.58; between the lowest and middle
categories, the correlation is r = 0.73. These correlations are still moderately strong by
time–series standards, particularly considering that the most and least sophisticated
only represent, on average, the top and bottom quintile of respondents. It is interesting
to note that although the least sophisticated seem to have more attenuated movement
than the other sophistication levels, this series shows sizeable over–time movement in
the direction of a liberal trend. The least sophisticated appear to respond to some of
the messages that the most sophisticated receive, as well as to other information that
has pushed this group in a liberal direction over time.
The stronger relationship between the vocabulary series most likely results because
of the more equal distribution of the number of respondents in each subgroup. Al-
though I hypothesize that all political sophistication levels update their opinions in
response to common messages about the economy, it is not surprising that more simi-
larities exist between the top third and bottom third of respondents than the top and
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Table 3.2: Correlations Between Mood Indices for Three Educational Sub-
strata, 1972–2004
Educational Attainment
Educational Attainment No HS Diploma HS Diploma College Diploma
No HS Diploma 1.00
HS Diploma 0.73 1.00
College Diploma 0.58 0.92 1.00
Note: All correlations have an N = 33, and all are statistically significant.
bottom twenty percent. The expectation that all sophistication levels use economic
information to update their political attitudes does not preclude the possibility that
the most sophisticated incorporate additional information. The finding, however, leads
me to focus on the educational substrata for the remainder of the analysis. As the
differences between Figures 3.2 and 3.3 suggest, the smaller percent of respondents in
the top and bottom education subgroups provides a more robust test of the hypothesis
of uniform causal dynamics.9
9To further test the validity of using education as a measure of political sophistication, I used
eleven spending questions from the American National Election Surveys (ANES) to generate a second
(biannual) measure of Mood from 1980 to 2004. Because the ANES asks respondents their education
level and questions that reflect their political information level it is possible to create and compare an
ANES measure of policy Mood for the least educated and the least politically informed respondents. If
the Mood of the least educated and the least politically informed correlate highly, we can be confident
that there is significant overlap between these two subgroups, and using a measure of political infor-
mation (if it was available) would not lead to different results than using the education measure. On
the other hand, if significant differences appear, we will have evidence that the opinions of education
groups and political information groups move distinctly, indicating that education level may not a
valid proxy for political awareness level. First, I compare the ANES Mood measure with the GSS
Mood measure to ensure that the two aggregate measures both capture the public’s “Mood.” The two
series correlate at r = 0.88, suggesting that the two measures indeed capture the same concept. Next,
I group ANES respondents by education and political information level. Following Zaller (1992), I
create a thirteen-point index of political information based on: correctly identifying which political
party controls the House, which party controls the Senate, and correct (relative) placement of the
parties on defense spending, government service, aid to Blacks, liberal/conservative scale, guaranteed
jobs, and health care (see Appendix for question wording). Each correct response is coded as a one.
Respondents could also get five points based on the interviewer rating of respondent’s level of polit-
ical information. Although the biannual nature of the ANES does not permit time–series regression
analysis, it is possible to compare the Mood of the least educated (those with less than a high school
degree) with the Mood of the least politically informed. The percent of respondents with less than
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Before analyzing the causal dynamics of Mood across sophistication levels, I assess
two critical assumptions of the analysis. First, the systematic opinion change among
those with less than a high school degree, depicted in Figure 3.3, could result from
aggregation. If the majority of the least sophisticated respondents provide stable or
random responses, as aggregate opinion theory predicts (Converse, 1990; Page and
Shapiro, 1992; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002), a few informed individuals in
this subgroup could produce the systematic movement we observed. The theoretical
expectations, however, predict that instead of a few informed individuals emerging
from a “sea of noise” (Converse 1990, 382) nearly all individuals receive and respond to
economic messages. To test this expectation, I further disaggregate Mood by education
level. The GSS reports the highest school grade level completed for each respondent.
This variable allows me to create a measure of Mood for each grade level. Figure 3.4
depicts the Mood of those with less than a high school degree, as well as those who
did not complete 11th, 10th, and 9th grade. The similarity across series is astonishing.
The subgroup including only those who did not complete the ninth grade is less than
half the size of the group of those who did not complete high school. Yet, the two series
follow virtually the same trajectory.
Table 3.3 examines the correlations between series all the way to those respondents
who did not complete sixth grade. The table also shows the average number and per-
cent of respondents in each education grouping. It is not until we analyze respondents
with less than a sixth grade education—just 1.9 percent of respondents—that the cor-
relations substantially drop. It is simply wrong to conclude that the opinion movement
a high school degree decreased over time, so each year I match the percent or respondents who are
“politically uninformed” as closely as possible to the percent with less than a high school degree. From
1980 to 2000, the Mood of the least educated and the least politically informed correlate at r = 0.87.
The two measures of sophistication—education and political information are not one–in–the–same—
but the similarities are clear. The high correlation suggests that education level, at least for Policy
Mood, is indeed a valid measure of political sophistication.
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Figure 3.4: Mood Indices for those with Less than a High School Degree, Less than
11th Grade, Less than 10th Grade, and Less than 9th Grade, 1972 to 2004
of the least sophisticated results from a few informed respondents amidst mostly ran-
dom responders. Although some unsophisticated individuals certainly offer random
responses, the “sea of noise” that Converse describes, does not begin to emerge until
we analyze less than two percent of all respondents.
A second assumption that I must test is the underlying structure of survey items
across sophistication levels. It is possible that the multi–item measure of Mood masks
different opinions between the subgroups across policy areas. For example, if the most
sophisticated favor spending more money on education and the environment while the
least sophisticated favor increased spending on welfare and helping the sick, both series
would rise at the same time, but for different reasons. If the different sophistication
levels move in tandem, in a causal sense, we should see specific question items loading
onto each index in a similar manner for each level of political sophistication. Table
3.4 analyzes this expectation by comparing how individual question responses made by
80
T
a
b
le
3
.3
:
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
s
B
e
tw
e
e
n
M
o
o
d
In
d
ic
e
s
b
y
G
ra
d
e
L
e
v
e
l,
1
9
7
2
–
2
0
0
4
R
es
p
on
d
en
ts
:
L
es
s
th
an
:
A
v
g.
N
P
er
ce
n
t
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
L
ev
el
H
.S
.
11
th
10
th
9t
h
8t
h
7t
h
6t
h
27
6
21
.9
%
L
es
s
th
an
H
ig
h
S
ch
o
ol
1.
00
21
6
17
.2
%
L
es
s
th
an
11
th
G
ra
d
e
0.
98
1.
00
15
7
12
.5
%
L
es
s
th
an
10
th
G
ra
d
e
0.
97
0.
90
1.
00
11
5
9.
1%
L
es
s
th
an
9t
h
G
ra
d
e
0.
94
0.
96
0.
98
1.
00
57
4.
5%
L
es
s
th
an
8t
h
G
ra
d
e
0.
93
0.
94
0.
94
0.
94
1.
00
39
3.
1%
L
es
s
th
an
7t
h
G
ra
d
e
0.
89
0.
87
0.
91
0.
94
0.
90
1.
00
24
1.
9%
L
es
s
th
an
6t
h
G
ra
d
e
0.
51
0.
48
0.
42
0.
37
0.
46
0.
40
1.
00
N
ot
e:
A
ll
co
rr
el
at
io
n
s
h
av
e
an
N
=
33
,
an
d
al
l
ar
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
ll
y
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t.
81
individuals in each subgroup load onto the overall measure of Mood for that subgroup.
In order to keep comparisons of the correlations as similar as possible, only the questions
asked 15 times or more are included in the table.
Table 3.4: Correlations Between Survey Items and Mood Indices, by So-
phistication Level, 1972–2004
Level of Sophistication:
Survey Item Years Asked Lowest Middle Highest
Imprv nation’s educ system 24 0.84 0.68 0.84
Solve Problems of big cities 24 0.73 0.72 0.70
Protect environment 24 0.67 0.72 0.86
School busing 17 0.94 0.73 0.67
Taxes 18 0.72 0.66 0.63
Help the sick 15 0.47 0.89 0.54
Military and defense 24 0.25 0.58 0.65
Housing discrimination 17 0.82 0.69 0.44
Affirmative action 15 0.18 0.48 0.36
Gun permits 22 0.69 0.59 0.47
Welfare 24 0.57 0.75 0.85
Imprv nation’s health 24 0.61 0.82 0.82
Imprv conditions of blacks 24 0.72 0.87 0.93
Capital punishment 23 -0.10 -0.24 -0.28
Courts and criminals 25 0.71 0.19 -0.01
Space exploration program 24 0.58 0.29 -0.06
Special help to blacks 16 -0.15 0.48 0.49
Solve problems 16 -0.54 0.60 0.47
Reduce diff btw rich/poor 17 -0.26 0.76 0.65
Help the poor 16 -0.68 0.64 0.69
% of all (31) Indicator Var. Expl. 35 40 37
Note: Sophistication level refers to those not receiving a high-school
diploma, those receiving a high-school diploma but not a college diploma,
and those receiving a college diploma or higher. For precise question
wordings, see the Appendix.
A surprising, but interpretable pattern emerges in Table 3.4. First, we see that the
common variance explained (i.e., the percent of the variance that is common across
question items) is similar across sub–groups (the range is 35 to 40 percent; Stimson
has consistently found values just below 40 percent). More importantly, for 13 of
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the twenty items (in bold), the correlations across subgroups are remarkably similar,
suggesting that the same policy issues load onto each subgroup’s Mood in a similar way.
In the remaining third of the items, we see negative correlations and differences across
subgroups. What is interesting about these seven items is that, with the exception
of “space exploration,” they all correspond with Stimson’s second dimension of Mood
(Stimson 1999: 71; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002: 208).10 It appears that
the first dimension of Mood reflects the same underlying policy attitudes for each
sophistication level. The second dimension of Mood, which Stimson characterizes as
representing attitudes toward crime and criminals and social issues, like helping those
in need, may reflect different underlying ideologies across subgroups.
What the table shows, for the first time, is some evidence of ideology, albeit of the
macro flavor, at the lowest end of the sophistication spectrum. The combined results
of these figures and tables stand in contrast to decades of individual–level research
that documented the absence of ideological thinking—or even political thinking at
all—among the non–elite portions of the mass public. Similarly, the expectations of
many researchers in the macro tradition do not hold. The least sophisticated, far from
canceling out or producing random noise, show systematic opinion change across time.
3.5 Uniform Causal Dynamics
The visual displays of similar–looking time series have produced impressive results.
Despite overwhelmingly low levels of political knowledge in the American electorate
(Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996) the most and least politically sophisticated seem to
10The eleven question items asked less than fifteen years follow the same first and second dimension
patterns, but as we would expect, the shorter series show much more variability. Four items have
similar coefficients across sophistication levels, matching the pattern in bold in Table 3. For four
items the coefficients of the middle and highest sophistication levels load differently from the least
sophisticated and for three of the items the least and middle sophistication levels load similarly, and
the most sophisticated are distinct.
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change opinions in tandem. Furthermore, we have seen that this pattern of opinion
change among the least sophisticated is not a result of aggregating across issues or
respondents. A more direct test of the hypothesis, however, is to assess whether the
similarity of sub–aggregated opinion movements results because these different series
have common causal dynamics. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, ch. 6) model
Mood (not disaggregated) as a function of inflation and yearly shifts in the unemploy-
ment rate. Increases in the unemployment rate tend to fuel demand for government
activism, while inflationary pressures produce the opposite reaction with a demand
for government belt–tightening. I expect the same statistical relationships between
Mood and the economy at all levels of sophistication. Recent research suggests that all
citizens, and thus all strata of society, have incentives to pay attention to economic indi-
cators (Parker-Stephen and MacKuen, 2005). Additionally, the cognitive requirements
of noticing whether the economy is getting better or worse are minimal. Although only
the most sophisticated evaluate and forecast the economy with precision, nearly all
individuals should notice economic ups and downs. The wealthy and highly educated
may get their economic information from different sources than the less educated, but
all portions of society should receive and respond to changes in objective economic
messages.
Table 3.5 begins with Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s findings on the effects of
inflation and unemployment on overall Mood, 1956–1996 (2002; see their Table 6.4).
Column two reports the effects of inflation and unemployment on the GSS–based mea-
sure of Mood, not subdivided by sophistication. The fully aggregated analysis ensures
that the subsequent results are as comparable to theirs as possible. These aggregate
results provide confirmation that my measure of Mood parallels the Mood measure
used by Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson. Despite the shortened time series, and thus
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higher standard errors, all coefficients are statistically significant and of relatively sim-
ilar magnitude to Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson’s analysis.
We are most interested, however, in whether economic changes influence policy
Mood similarly for all sophistication levels. I expect that the relationship between
the economic indicators and policy Mood will be in the same direction and statistically
significant for each subgroup. Similar relationships will provide evidence that the most,
middle, and least sophisticated receive and understand messages about inflation and
unemployment, and then update their attitudes toward government in tandem.
To examine the relationship between the economy and Mood, I estimate the three
regression equations (one for each sophistication level) jointly in a Seemingly Unrelated
Regression Equations (SUR) model (Zellner, 1962, 1963). Given that the series come
from the same surveys, the disturbance terms are likely to be correlated across equa-
tions. The SUR model estimates this expected correlation—incorporating information
that is unavailable in separate regressions—and thus produces more efficient estimates.
Binkley and Nelson (1988) demonstrate that efficiency gains persist even when vari-
ables are correlated across equations, giving further evidence that the SUR model is
the most efficient estimator of the set of equations.11
Consistent with expectations, the last three columns of Table 3.5 show remarkably
similar causal dynamics across sophistication levels. At each sophistication level the
coefficients are all in the expected directions; inflation is associated with a more con-
servative Mood and increased unemployment with a more liberal Mood. Furthermore,
the negative relationship between increased inflation and a more liberal policy Mood
is statistically significant for the least, middle, and most sophisticated. Even those
without a high school diploma translate price increases into more conservative political
11As might be expected, due to the small disturbance terms, estimating the equations individu-
ally produces nearly identical results. When the equations are estimated in separate regressions, all
statistically significant relationships remain significant at p<.10 or less.
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attitudes. Also, as expected, each sophistication level appears to translate increases in
the unemployment rate into more liberal political attitudes. Although the relationship
between unemployment and Mood for the least sophisticated is not statistically signif-
icant (p = 0.12), cross–equation tests for equality confirm the similar nature of all of
the coefficients. In no case were the cross–equation differences statistically significant.
While we need to be cautious about concluding that all sophistication levels translate
unemployment changes into political attitudes in a uniform manner, the lack of statis-
tically significant differences across sophistication levels greatly challenges the notion
that aggregate public opinion only reflects the “small minority of the electorate that is
nearly as well informed...as our elite informants” (Converse, 1990, 382).12
The similar causal dynamics across sophistication levels, particularly the response
to inflation, confirms the expectation that all segments of the population translate
economic information into political attitudes. It is necessary, however, to examine
the magnitude and immediacy of these effects. As expected, the lagged dependent
variables (Dynamics) are all statistically significant. Importantly, the coefficient for
the lagged dependent variable is strongest for the least sophisticated. Considering that
in a partial–adjustment (or Koyck) model such as this, the lagged dependent variable
represents the omitted effects of previous lags of the independent variables—inflation
and unemployment in this case—this finding makes opinion of the least educated seem
more inertial, slowest to respond to shifts in the economy. By contrast, the smaller
12To be certain that the findings do not result because of the specific items in the Mood index, I re-
estimated the analysis with several different Mood specifications. One potential concern is respondent
redundancy between similarly worded spending questions in years when the GSS introduced new
question wording. To account for this concern, I re-estimated the Mood measure omitting the “Y”
version of each spending question. The results of the analysis were nearly identical, with all significant
relationships remaining consistent at p< .10 or less. I also ran the analysis using the Mood measure
used by Ellis, Ura, and Robinson (2006), which includes only eleven spending items. With this
specification all relationships remained significant and Change in Unemployment became significant
for the least sophisticated. The consistent pattern of results suggests that the analysis is not sensitive
to the particular question items included in the Mood index.
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Table 3.5: The Causal Dynamics of Mood, by Level of Sophistication, 1972-
2004
1956-1996 1972-2004 SUR Model 1972-2004
All All No HS Dip. HS Dip. College Dip.
Dynamics 0.38* 0.72* 0.79* 0.76* 0.6*
(0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11)
Inflation -0.78* -0.49* -0.43* -0.45* -0.79*
(0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.20) (0.33)
Change in 1.10* 1.54a 1.16 1.83* 2.19a
Unemployment (0.48) (0.95) (1.0) (0.85) (1.34)
Constant 41.57* 21.30* 9.38* 18.62* 31.4*
(9.34) (8.66) (14.3) (6.2) (8.29)
Adj. R2 0.58 0.84 0.89 0.85 0.67
N 41 32 32 32 32
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; * = p < 0.05, a = p < 0.1
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable for the middle stratum, and the smallest
still for the highest stratum—and the larger coefficients for the immediate impacts of the
economic variables—suggest that opinion of the relatively more sophisticated responds
more rapidly to the dynamics of the economy. It appears that the immediate influence
of inflation and unemployment on Mood are weakest for the least–sophisticated stratum
of American society, but their effects (because of strong dynamics) continue to appear
in subsequent time periods. In these models, the total effect of a variable is equal to
the immediate influence divided by one minus the lagged dependent variable. In this
light, the total effects for a one–point shift in inflation become almost identical across
the three levels of sophistication. For the least sophisticated, the total effect is a 2.05
(i.e., -0.43/(1-0.79)) point conservative shift in Mood. For the middle stratum, the
cumulative effect is 1.88 points, and for the top stratum it is 1.98 points. What this
means, for inflation at least, is that shifts in the economy produce nearly identical total
effects across all sophistication strata of the public. These effects take longer to work
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their way through for the least sophisticated, and they happen most quickly among the
most sophisticated, but their total effect is nearly the same.
For shifts in unemployment, where the differences in the immediate–impact coef-
ficients are larger, the total influence of the variables differ more as well. Among the
least sophisticated, the total influence of a one–point increase in unemployment is a
5.52 (i.e., 1.16/(1-0.79)) point shift toward liberalism. Among the middle segment, the
total influence is a bit larger, 7.63 points. For the most sophisticated, the total is a 5.48
point shift toward liberalism. As with inflation, for the most sophisticated, a larger
portion of the total influence of changes in unemployment comes immediately. For the
least sophisticated, the changes take longer to affect Mood.
The most sophisticated incorporate economic changes more quickly into their po-
litical attitudes than the least sophisticated, but statistically speaking, and in terms
of total effect, the influence of economic changes on political attitudes is remarkably
similar across sophistication levels. The finding that the upper tier of sophisticates has
a similar causal structure to overall Mood is not at all surprising; in fact, it is precisely
what micro and macro public opinion theories predict. Similarly, the movement of
the middle tier shows that elements of Zaller’s RAS model find support. But instead
of following a “white noise” pattern that might represent “aggregate non–attitudes”
as the macro scholars and the RAS model predict, opinion at the lowest level follows
much the same patterns—with understandable differences—as opinion at highest levels
of political sophistication.
3.6 Conclusions
Images of highly informed individuals dominating public opinion are deeply entrenched
in political science. Converse (2000, 387) concludes that, “those poorly informed tend to
suffer at least partial disenfranchisement.” This analysis, however, confirms Erikson,
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MacKuen, and Stimson’s (2002) finding that all sophistication strata contribute to
aggregate shifts in policy Mood. For each sophistication group, opinion dynamics
visually share much in common. The analysis also shows, for the first time, that the
commonalities of Mood do not result because of a few systematic responses amidst a
sea of noise or because Mood aggregates across issues. Most importantly, however, I
find that across the three tiers of sophistication, Mood is a function of the same broad
causal processes. Even the least sophisticated receive and respond to objective economic
indicators. Together, these findings suggest that the least sophisticated contribute a
lot more signal and a lot less noise to Mood than previous theories of opinion change
predict.
Can these results be reconciled with micro findings (e.g., Zaller 1992 and Bartels
1994) and macro predictions (e.g., Converse 1990, Converse 2000, and Erikson, MacK-
uen, & Stimson 2002) that the politically sophisticated dominate opinion change, while
the opinions of the least sophisticated remain constant or contribute only random noise?
I believe they can be. The evidence in this paper suggests that the least sophisticated re-
ceive the same general messages (at least about the economy) as the most sophisticated,
and use this information to update their opinions in the same way. It is still possible,
maybe even probable, that the most sophisticated incorporate more information than
the least sophisticated, at least in a statistical sense. And the results show that the
most sophisticated incorporate information more quickly, while the least sophisticated
incorporate it the least quickly. This finding suggests that political sophistication does
indeed influence message reception, resistance, and accessibility (Zaller, 1992). Sub-
stantively, however, the extra information that political sophisticates receive and the
increased likelihood of message reception, resistance, and accessibility contributes very
little to the variance in policy Mood. In other words, this analysis does not negate previ-
ous findings that opinion change and attitude stability vary by political sophistication.
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The findings, instead, provide evidence for Page & Shapiro’s (1992) supposition that
despite such variations, there are broad messages that eventually reach all segments of
society, and the responses to these broad messages move public opinion.
There are also implications for representative democracy in these findings. The
over–time movements in public opinion have been connected to shifts in policy outcomes
(Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, ch. 8).
The opinion constructs considered in those analyses have always been aggregated to the
entire electorate, and appropriately so, given the subject matter. The findings in this
paper help to shed some additional light on the notion of precisely whose preferences
are being represented in policy making. The answer may not quite be “everyone’s,” but
it is far closer than previous literature expects. For policy Mood at least, it is incorrect
to describe the survey responses of any segment of the public as “non–attitudes” or “a
sea of noise.”
Of course, this paper leaves many questions unaddressed. Primary among them is
whether there are inter–relationships among the various strata of sophistication. We
saw in Tables 1 and 2 that the time paths of the different groups are strongly correlated,
but the data are annual. Could it be that an analysis based on quarterly data would
reveal that those at the top of the information hierarchy are actually leading—that
is, causing—the opinion movements of those down the pecking order?13 Differenti-
ated response rates would not change the findings. The least sophisticated still receive
and respond to messages, but this pattern would qualify the rather optimistic conclu-
sions above about the democratic process. Alternatively, are all strata following the
common message of the economy blindly? There are times during economic upswings
13At least with GSS data, such an analysis is not possible, as their surveys occur the same time
every year.
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when continued or increased government spending would be advisable. Not even polit-
ical sophisticates, however, appear to make such distinctions in their attitudes toward
government. These subtleties are the focus of future research.
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Appendix A
Coding of Messages about Vietnam
The WEIS dataset codes events by day, so it is easy to create a time–series of all events
that relate to the Vietnam conflict. The next step is coding the events to reflect whether
messages correspond with support or opposition to the president’s handling of the war.
WEIS categorizes stories into twenty–two categories. I code the categories of Yield,
Approve, Promise, Grant, Reward, Agree, Request, and Propose, as supportive frames
and Reject, Accuse, Protest, Deny, Demand, Warn, Threaten, Demonstrate, Reduce
Relations, Expel, Seize, and Force as opposing frames.1 The eight supportive categories
coincide with two types of supportive frames. One type consists of demonstrations
of support between the United States and its allies in Vietnam. Examples include,
“United Kingdom government declared support for US decision to resume bombing,”
“Vietnamese invite 33 nations to observe elections,” and “Australia praised USA efforts
to avert communism in Vietnam.” I expect that the public associated these declarations
with support for the president’s handling of the war. The second type of supportive
stories reflect support between North Vietnam and its allies. I expect comments of
support for North Vietnam by U.S. enemies to lead to increase the U.S. public’s support
for the war and the president’s handling of the war. Examples include, “USR reiterates
support for Vietnam” and “USR and Hungary agree to take all necessary steps to
end USA aggression against Vietnam.” Although the comments themselves appear
antagonistic, these comments substantiate U.S. involvement and would serve to rally
support for the president and the war effort.
The oppositional frames tend to reflect specific critiques of how the U.S. was han-
dling the situation in Vietnam or descriptions of negative outcomes in Vietnam. Ex-
amples include, “Yugoslav president severely criticized USA role in Vietnam and ac-
cused USA of trying to solve war exclusively through military means,” “12,000 students
demonstrated in front of U.S. cultural center in Berlin against U.S. Vietnam policies,”
and “Vietnam seizes USA Air–Force B–52 in southern part of Demilitarized Zone.” I
expect that each of these messages would lead to a negative or oppositional impression
about the situation in Vietnam and the president’s handling of the war.
Not all messages, however, have an equal influence. For example, a news story about
a country deploying troops would leave a stronger impression than a report about a
country threatening to send troops. To account for these differences, Vincent (1979)
1These codings correspond with previous research which has classified WEIS data onto a bipolar
scale Goldstein and Freeman (1990); Rajmaira and Ward (1990); Vincent (1979); Witko (2003).
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has developed a weighting scheme for each of the categories in the WEIS dataset.2 I
use Vincent’s scale as a measure of the weight or prominence of each message. The
message weight ranges from 2.2 to 4.7.
2Within each of the twenty–two categories are more specific categories, resulting in sixty–three
possible event classifications. Goldstein (1992) has developed a weighting scheme based on all sixty–
three classifications but he finds the new classifications largely confirms Vincent’s classification scheme.
He writes, “The replications above do more to corroborate than to challenge the validity of past studies
using the Vincent scale” (382). I thus use the twenty–two category Vincent scale, which is based on
the rankings of importance that 30 International Relations scholars applied to the different event type
categories.
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Appendix B
Question Wording: Chapter 2
Welfare Spending
NATFARE GSS: Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount...on
welfare?
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll: Do you think government is currently spending
too little, about the right amount, or too much...on people on welfare?
VCF0894 NES: If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which of
the following programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would
you like to see spending decreased? Should federal spending on Welfare Programs be
increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
Political Information (ANES)
VCF0729: Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the House
of Representatives in Washington before the election (this/last) month? Which one?
VCF9036: Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the U.S.
Senate before the election this/last month? Which One?
VCF0549: Some people believe that we should spend much less money on defense.
Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. And, of course, other
people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place the Democratic
Party on this scale?
VCF0550: Where would you place the Republican Party on this scale?
VCF0541: Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in
areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that
it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an
increase in spending. Where would you place the Democratic Party (on this scale)?
VCF0542: Where would you place the Republican Party (on this scale)?
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VCF0517: Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every
possible effort to improve the social and economic positions of blacks. Others feel that
the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should
help themselves. Where would you place the Democratic Party (on this scale)?
VCF0518: Where would you place the Republican Party?
VCF0503: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I’m go-
ing to show you a seven–point scale on which the political views that people hold are
arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place the
Democratic Party (on this scale)?
VCF0504: Where would you place the Republican Party?
VCF0513: Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that
every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government
should just let each person get ahead on his/her own. And, of course, some other peo-
ple have opinions in between. Where would you place the Democratic Party (on this
scaler)?
VCF0514: Where would you place the Republican Party?
VCF0508: There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs.
Some feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical
and hospital expenses. Others feel that medical expenses should be paid by individuals,
and through private insurance like Blue Cross. Where would you place the Democratic
Party on this scale?
VCF0509: Where would you place the Republican Party?
VCF0050b: Respondent’s general level of information about politics and public affairs
seemed:
Policy Mood
Thirteen question items that relate to attitudes toward government spending comprise
the Liberal/Conservative Ideology index. The questions, which come from the GSS,
each begin with the following question stem:
We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be
solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems,
and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending
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too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Are we
spending too much, too little, or about the right amount...
NATAID N=24: on foreign aid?
NATARMS N=24: on the military, armaments, and defense?
NATCITY N=24: on solving the problems of big cities?
NATCRIME N= 24: on halting the rising crime rate?
NATDRUG N= 24: on dealing with drug addiction?
NATEDUC N=24: on improving the nation’s education system?
NATENVIR N=24: on improving and protecting the environment?
NATHEAL N=24: on improving and protecting the nation’s health?
NATMASS N=15: on mass transportation?
NATPARK N=15: on parks and recreation?
NATROAD N=15: on highways and bridges?
NATSOC N=15: on social security?
NATSPAC N=24 on the space exploration program?
Racial Liberalism
BUSING N=17 GSS: In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black/African-
American) and white school children from one school district to another?
RACOPEN N=17 GSS: Suppose there is a community–wide vote on the general hous-
ing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on. Which law would you vote for? A.
One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even
if he prefers not to sell to (Negroes/Blacks/African–Americans). B. The second law
says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color.
RACDIF2 N=14 GSS: On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African Americans) have worse
jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are... Be-
cause most (Negroes/Blacks/African Americans) have less in–born ability to learn?
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RACDIF4 N=14 GSS: On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African Americans) have worse
jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are... Be-
cause most (Negroes/Blacks/African Americans) just don’t have the motivation or will
power to pull themselves up out of poverty?
VCF0816 N=8 NES: Some people say that the government in Washington should see
to it that white and Negro children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim
that this is not the government’s business. Have you been concerned enough about
this question to favor one side over the other? [If yes] Do you think the government in
Washington should see to it that white and black children go to the same schools, or
stay out of this area, as it is none of government’s business.
VCF0206 N=15 NES: We’d also like to get your feelings about some groups in Amer-
ican society. When I read the name of a group [Blacks], we’d like you to rate it with
what we call a feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees-100 degrees mean that
you feel favorably and warm toward the group; ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean
that you don’t feel favorably towards the group and that you don’t care too much for
that group. If you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward a group you would rate
them at 50 degrees. If we come to a group you don’t know much about, just tell me
and we’ll move on to the next one.
The high correlations between each item and the overall index, shown below in Table
A–1, suggest that the individual question items each relate to the broader latent concept
of attitudes toward African Americans. The average correlation between each item and
the overall index is r = 0.758. The question items in Kellstedt’s (2000) racial policy
measure had an average correlation of r = 0.55 with the overall index. Adding further
confidence to the measure of Racial Liberalism is the fact that the resulting composite
series accounts for at least 66 percent of the variance in the individual indicators.
Table A-1: Correlations of Indicators of Attitudes Toward Race with Overall
Index
Correlation with Index
Item N All College <H.S. Elem. Low Income
Busing 17 0.942 0.916 0.917 0.934 0.866
Open Housing 17 0.995 0.940 0.927 0.915 0.942
Help African Americans 8 0.839 -0.193 0.883 0.858 0.845
Feeling Thermometer 16 0.849 0.878 0.645 0.410 0.764
Ability to Learn 14 0.978 0.864 0.942 0.930 0.924
Motivation 14 0.877 0.728 0.898 0.714 0.682
Pct. variance explained 83.71 69.69 76.05 66.29 71.73
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Appendix C
Question Wording: Chapter 3
GSS Mood Index Questions
AFFRMACT N=15 Some say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be
given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring
and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about
your opinion – are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks? If
favors: Do you favor preference in hiring and promotion strongly or not strongly? If
opposes: Do you oppose preference in hiring and promotion strongly or not strongly?
BUSING N=17 In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black/African
American) and white school children from one school district to another?
CAPPUN N=23 Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of
murder?
COURTS N=25 In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not
harshly enough with criminals?
EQWLTH N=17 Some people think the government in Washington ought to reduce
the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of
wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the
government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the
rich and poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning
that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and
a score of 7 meaning the government should not concern itself with reducing income
differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?
GUNLAW N=22 Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to
obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?
HELPBLK N=16 Some people think that (Blacks/Negroes/African Americans) have
been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to
help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not
be giving special treatment to (Blacks/Negroes/African Americans). Where would you
place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you made up your mind on this?
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HELPNOT N=16 Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to
do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others
disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country’s
problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place
yourself on this scale, or haven’t you made up your mind about this?
HELPPOOR N=16 I’d like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are im-
portant. Some people think that the government in Washington should to everything
possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at point 1 on
this card. Other people think it is not the government’s responsibility, and that each
person should take care of himself; they are at point 5. Where would you place yourself
on this scale, or haven’t you made up your mind on this?
HELPSICK N=16 In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the
government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and
hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal
government and that people should take care of these things themselves. Where would
you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you made up your mind on this?
RACOPEN N=17 Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing is-
sue. There are two possible laws to vote on. One law says that a homeowner can
decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to Ne-
groes/Blacks/African Americans. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse
to sell to someone because of their race and color. Which law would you vote for?
TAX N=18 Do you consider the amount of federal income tax which you have to pay
as too high, about right, or too low?
Spending Stem: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which
can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and
for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money
on it, too little money, or about the right amount.
NATARMS N=24 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
the military, armaments, and defense?
NATARMSY N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount
on national defense?
NATCITY N=24 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
solving the problems of big cities?
NATCITYY N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount
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on assistance to big cities?
NATEDUC N=24 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
improving the nation’s education system?
NATEDUCY N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount
on education?
NATENVIR N=24 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
improving and protecting the environment?
NATENVIY N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
the environment?
NATFARE N=24 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
welfare?
NATFAREY N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount
on assistance to the poor?
NATHEAL N=24 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
improving and protecting the nation’s health?
NATHEALY N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount
on health?
NATMASS N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
mass transportation?
NATRACE N=24 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
improving the conditions of blacks?
NATRACEY N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount
on assistance to blacks?
NATROAD N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
highways and bridges?
NATSOC N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
social security?
NATSPAC N=24 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on
the space exploration program?
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NATSPACY N=15 Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount
on space exploration?
ANES Mood Index Questions
VCF0839 N=11 Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even
in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel
that it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means
an increase in spending. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you
thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
VCF0843 N=11 Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense.
(1996: Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Others feel that
defense spending should be greatly increased. (1996: Suppose these people are at the
other end, at point 7.) Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven’t you
thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)
Spending Stem: If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for
which programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like
to see spending decreased: Should federal spending on [ITEM] be increased, decreased
or kept about the same?
VCF0887 N=8 Child care
VCF0888 N=7 Dealing with crime
VCF0890 N=9 Public schools
VCF0892 N=5 Foreign aid
VCF0894 N=6 Welfare programs
VCF9046 N=8 Food Stamps
VCF9047 N=9 Improving and protecting the environment
VCF9048 N=6 Science and technology/Space and scientific research/ the space program
VCF9049 N=10 Social Security
VCF9050 N=6 Programs that assist blacks
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ANES Political Information Index Questions
VCF0729: Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the House
of Representatives in Washington before the election (this/last) month? Which one?
VCF9036: Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the U.S.
Senate before the election this/last month? Which One?
VCF0549: Some people believe that we should spend much less money on defense.
Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. And, of course, other
people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place the Democratic
Party on this scale?
VCF0550: Where would you place the Republican Party on this scale?
VCF0541: Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in
areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that
it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an
increase in spending. Where would you place the Democratic Party (on this scale)?
VCF0542: Where would you place the Republican Party (on this scale)?
VCF0517: Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every
possible effort to improve the social and economic positions of blacks. Others feel that
the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should
help themselves. Where would you place the Democratic Party (on this scale)?
VCF0518: Where would you place the Republican Party?
VCF0503: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I’m go-
ing to show you a seven–point scale on which the political views that people hold are
arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place the
Democratic Party (on this scale)?
VCF0504: Where would you place the Republican Party?
VCF0513: Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that
every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government
should just let each person get ahead on his/her own. And, of course, some other peo-
ple have opinions in between. Where would you place the Democratic Party (on this
scaler)?
VCF0514: Where would you place the Republican Party?
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VCF0508: There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs.
Some feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical
and hospital expenses. Others feel that medical expenses should be paid by individuals,
and through private insurance like Blue Cross. Where would you place the Democratic
Party on this scale?
VCF0509: Where would you place the Republican Party?
VCF0050b: Respondent’s general level of information about politics and public affairs
seemed:
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